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1 Introduction 
 
The decade long civil war in Sierra Leone (to be referred to as SL) gave rise to 
massive violations of human rights. Post-conflict, the state has deployed various 
mechanisms to address demands for accountability. This thesis will aim to examine key 
issues and debates regarding connections between human rights norms relating to victim 
reparations and their implementation. There will be a theoretical and practical examination. 
Key legal sources and obligations arising in both international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law will be reviewed from a practical standpoint. By using an 
interdisciplinary approach of international law, social sciences, and anthropology, this 
thesis will address the challenges towards establishing an appropriate reparation program 
for amputees in SL.  
 
1.1 Research objective and questions 
 
The objective of this thesis is to analyze basic concepts of victim reparations and the 
failure of implementing a sustainable reparations program for victims in SL eight years 
after the decade long civil war.  
 
Throughout the thesis 5 key questions will be addressed:  
1. Does international human rights law support reparation, and if so, do they obligate 
countries to provide them in post-conflict settings? 
2. What do victim reparations schemes aim to achieve? Could these aims be achieved 
in SL?  
3. How does the structure of Sierra Leone‟s Reparation Program (SLRP) effect its 
implementation? 
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4. What are the grave challenges to implementing an efficient and accountable 
reparation program in SL? Are these external or internal factors? 
5. What are the implications of not providing prompt, adequate and efficient 
reparation in SL? What are the results of not providing life supporting mechanisms 
for amputees?  
 
1.2 Relevance of study  
 
If gross human rights violations are not addressed and alleviated through the 
application of international norms, then international instruments can be viewed as futile in 
addressing the real and practical needs of victims. The practice of human rights is 
particularly challenging in societies emerging from conflict. However, practical challenges 
need to be addressed in order to implement justiciable human rights law. These statements 
are however, general and abstract. Exploring in-depth challenges to application are 
necessary to create sustainable approaches to implement human rights. This is because 
practice inevitable plays a large role in the theoretical restrictions of human rights. 
SL‟s conflict was extremely brutal. Due to media influence, the brutality was well 
known to the world. Amputations, child soldiers, bush wives are of the main depictions of 
the forms of violence that took place. Yet, few know the situation of victims today, or the 
extent of trauma they persevered. There are 1,285 registered amputees in SL, but a real 
neglect in research means few know of their current situation. Considering the amount of 
attention and funding directed towards ex-combatants and to the process of peace itself, it 
is alarming to note this disparity. This thesis attempts to direct attention back towards 
victims, and open the eyes to the outside world to their traumas.   
Throughout this thesis, readers will gain insight into how SL recognizes and attempts 
to rectify past wrongs, and understand challenges Government and victims face in 
establishing and implementing a credible national reparation program. Insufficient data, 
vague reports, and research of reparations in SL means that this thesis is an unprecedented 
accumulation of data and discussion with professionals, officials and victims regarding 
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reparation in SL. Hopefully this exploration will benefit practitioners, officials, and 
researchers, and bring new insight into creating a sustainable reparation program.  
   
 
1.3 Scope and limitation of the study 
 
1.3.1 Scope 
 
Studying post-conflicts settings are often challenging, and often analysis involves 
interdisciplinary approaches. Law, politics, geography, economics, development and 
conflict resolution are just a few of the many factors that can effect the questions posed to 
study.  Yet, this is not the only challenge. Law, politics, geography etc. are in such primary 
stages in SL. This is due to the ravaging affects of the decade long civil war. Obviously 
these factors have a huge impact on the provision of reparation packages. However, the 
scope of this thesis will extend only to SL‟s existing commitment to provide reparations to 
amputee victims of the civil war. Taking this into consideration, this thesis will analyze the 
practical ability of providing reparations to amputee victims. Reparations in SL will be 
viewed in the light of practical enforceability and implementation of international norms 
and regulations in a post-conflict setting.  
 Reparation itself is also an interdisciplinary field. Reparations and victims in this 
thesis will be defined using SL‟s official definitions taken from the findings of its Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Reparations comprise an array of various 
programs and projects in SL considering the vast amount of victims. However in this thesis 
we are focusing on the reparations program directly targeting the most vulnerable victims 
of SL‟s civil war. The term victim used throughout the thesis will be considered in the 
same light.  
The focus of the thesis shall be on the amputee‟s victims within the most vulnerable 
victim group. This is an identifiable victim group due to the visible evidence of torture on 
their bodies. The SLRP defines Amputees as “war-wounded victims who lost their upper 
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or lower limbs as a result of the conflict.”1 The amputee victim group is made up of 
victims of war from 1991 up until the end of the conflict in 2002.
2
 There are four main 
reasons for this choice. Firstly, the war in SL was notorious for being extremely brutal, the 
use of child soldiers and the atrocious use of amputation as tactic of warfare are often what 
people associate with SL. By limiting the field of study towards amputees, we are able to 
analyze how attention to one of the most vulnerable groups progressed since the end of the 
conflict. Secondly, access to information is extremely limited, partially due to lack of 
telecommunications infrastructure and high rates of illiteracy,
3
 therefore gathering data 
from a victim group which has an organizational structure, such as the Amputee and War 
Wounded Association (AWWA), is more achievable. All members of AWWA had been 
officially recognized by the Government as either amputee victims or seriously war 
wounded.
4
 Thirdly, due to their disabilities, this victim group is in dire need of continuous 
medical care and support to deal with their wounds from violence. Not only have they had 
their bodies dismembered, but there is also a very high rate of other bodily harm from 
prolonged incidents of torture, leaving other sources of chronic pain.
5
 Fourthly, their 
disability makes it very difficult to find other sources of income as even achieving 
independence to do daily tasks, such as dressing, washing, or making food is challenging. 
They are dependent on family, or a governmental support system.
6
    
The thesis will look at amputees from all over SL, as they are in various locations 
throughout the country, because the rules and procedure of the reparation program are 
equal for all victims.   
 
                                                 
1
TRC (2004) p.249 
2
Ibid. p.4 
3
[National Long Term Perspective Studies, SL?] (2004)  p.15 
4
Jarka (2009) 
5
Field Research 
6
Ibid. 
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1.3.1.1 Time frame 
 
The timeframe for the period to be analyzed in this thesis expands from the 
publication of the TRC report in 2004 (2 years after the formal end of the conflict), and up 
until December 2009, the final end date of SLRP Year One Project.  
 
1.3.2 Limitations 
 
As one can imagine there are several limitations to take into account while 
preparing a thesis on SL. Not only is SL one of the poorest countries in the world
7
, but it is 
in transition from a brutal civil war. This had and continues to affect the quantity and 
quality of data available for use.  
International norms, laws and definitions will be used to clarify the concept of 
victim reparation. This will be taken from international experts of victim reparation, and 
law. The main source of international law will be The Basic Principles and Guidelines on 
the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International 
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (to be 
referred to as Basic Principles). The Basic Principles will be used to address potential 
limitations that face the SLRP. The Basic Principles versus the concept of reparation in SL 
will be analyzed in Chapter 4.  
 In addition, there is no authoritative literature, as of yet, on the reparation scheme 
in SL. Literature on the current situation of victims is lacking, partially due to the difficulty 
of collecting reliable data on the subject. Conflicting reports and perceptions make it 
extremely difficult to objectify data. In addition, SL is extensively studied in transitional 
justice mechanisms such as the Special Court, and the situation of child soldiers. The lack 
of meaningful discussion between experts on the practice of reparations in SL leaves its 
imprint on the thesis. Project documents from the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund 
(PBF) and reports by the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) provide an 
                                                 
7
UNDP (2009) 
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overview of the achievements and challenges facing the SLRP. However, in order to 
provide a more in-depth analysis amputee victims have been extensively interviewed to 
identify and personify victim reparation. Interviews with all engaged/affected actors aim to 
provide a holistic overview concerning reparations in SL.    
 An additional limitation is the minimal focus of reparations in national media and 
society in general. Interviews were also conducted with members of civil society, 
government, and international NGOS, and demonstrated little awareness of SLRP‟s 
content. Amputee themselves have formed an association lobbying for benefits, in addition 
to a Norwegian organization
8
 working alongside the government that has provided housing 
and medical care to amputee victims. This thesis will not necessarily address these 
provisions as they are not explicitly stated in the agenda of the national reparation program 
until 2010.
9
 The structure of the national reparation program will be the focus of this 
thesis, as this is clearly identified and approved by the Government. In addition, symbolic 
effects of providing reparations to victims will not be included. 
 
1.4 Literature review 
 
Even if literature on the particular subject of reparations in SL is lacking, SL has 
committed itself to a reparations scheme based on the recommendations of the TRC report. 
The TRC report recommendations to provide social service packages to the most 
vulnerable victims of the conflict were based upon international norms and opinions.
10
 On 
this framework, the TRC report provides valuable information on the usage of international 
norms and accommodating them to the abilities and practicability of SL to provide 
reparation. The TRC report, published in 2004, will be a main source in this thesis, as it is 
the authoritative source of the history and complexities of the conflict.  
                                                 
8
The Norwegian Friends of SL (NGO) provides housing for amputees. http://www.slvenner.no 
9
Schanke (2010) 
10
TRC (2004) p.242 
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Other literature that will be used throughout the thesis will be provided by expert 
opinions such as The Handbook of Reparations,
11
 which is a practical guide for analyzing 
reparations and their concepts in international law, theory and practice. Transitional 
Justice
12
 also provides valuable contribution to the main concepts of victim reparations. 
These will supplement the thesis by attempting to identify practical challenges when 
applying international concepts of reparations. As stated in the scope and limitation, 
reparations consist of a wide array of arrangements. This is also accentuated in collected 
literature. Therefore emphasis will be placed on analyzing the background for applying 
reparations in post-conflict settings.  
International law and commentary is drawn from human rights law, international 
humanitarian law, and studies conducted by Special Rapporteurs in relation to providing 
reparations in post conflict societies. References to these reports will be stressed in the 
methodological section. These will guide in establishing general international norms and 
understanding the concept of reparation. This along with other literature such as the book 
International Criminal Tribunals and Victims of Crime
13
, arguing that international law 
obliges states to pay victim compensation.  
Press report, project documents, and reports play a valuable role in identifying 
strength/weaknesses of SLRP‟s operations. However, reading was undertaken with 
skepticism due to non-objective nature of these types of documents. Documents were often 
crafted with specific intentions, thus it was essential to balance reports against each other 
throughout the thesis.       
Literature was also essential in formatting and conducting successful field research. 
Books such as Writing for Scholars
14
, Fieldwork under Fire
15
, and Surviving Field 
Research: Working in violent and difficult situations
16
, were essential to collecting viable 
                                                 
11
The Handbook of Reparations (2006) 
12
Teitel (2000) 
13
Heikkila (2004) 
14
Nygaard (2008) 
15
Fieldwork Under Fire (1995) 
16
Surviving Field Research (2009) 
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data, and making sure ethical questions surrounding collecting data were addressed. This 
will be elaborated further in the methodology section below as to what were the concerns 
of data collection.   
 
1.5 Methodology 
 
The thesis is of an interdisciplinary nature, and therefore collecting information will 
be reflected in the methodology. In order to combine law, social sciences and anthropology 
in cohesive manner, normative values will be examined in Chapter 3. The structural 
organization of the reparations program (Chapter 4) will be balanced against the empirical 
data in the form of testimonies and interviews (Chapter 5). Before finally, Chapter 6 
assesses SLRP against Basic Principle‟s objectives, to assess if SLRP meets international 
reparation standards.   
 
1.5.1 Empirical vs. normative 
 
The methodology used places normative international values of reparation payments 
against the practical empirical data collection. The aim of the research is to combine field 
research, international human rights law, and relevant literature to provide an in depth 
analysis of the questions listed in section 1.1. This will produce vital insight towards 
accumulating ideas and results that can properly tackle the complex research objective of 
this thesis.  
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1.5.2 Field research  
 
Field research was conducted June-August 2009. The objective of the field research 
was to provide insight into the actual conditions of amputees in SL, and capture the range 
of views and actors engaging in, and affected by reparation policies. In addition, field 
research was to compensate for the lack of victim group statements, access to legal 
documents, official statistics and opinions. There were two separate groups of interview 
candidates.  
The first group consisted of candidates initially chosen for their strong involvement 
within the community in the form of civil advocates, lawyers, government officials, and 
high moral standing within SL. These are also persons with great insight into how the 
country works. The candidates created a „snowball sampling‟ effect17, meaning trust 
relationships with additional contacts were established by association. Initial candidates in 
this group were organizations or individuals that were known to the researcher personally, 
recommended, or mentioned in reports. They then suggested others that could be useful to 
talk to. In total there 15 interviews conducted in this group.  
The second group of interview candidates consisted of victims directly affected by 
the SLRP. Locating victims required working with victim organizations, and local 
contacts. The assistant field researcher was extremely useful in these situations. Field 
excursions to potential victim groups were conducted on a weekly basis. This resulted in 
completing over 100 victim testimonies over a three month field research period.  
 There are many challenges to be confronted whilst collecting testimonies. The aim 
was to not subject collected data to unnecessary ethical scrutiny. Thus guidelines and 
research was prepared before commencing with the collection. This included investigating 
various research methods, and applying various means to the collection method.  
 
 
 
                                                 
17
Ibid. p.79 
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1.5.2.1 Collection method 
 
When interviewing victims a questionnaire survey was provided alongside a 
conversational style format. This method was chosen after conferring with other 
researchers working in similar conditions.
18
  
Discussion groups were not established. The nature of the testimonies wished to be 
considered a subject of private matter according to many victims, and was therefore not a 
viable option.    
A questionnaire provided opportunities to take as many samples as possible in the 
short time spans, and locate trends of varying viewpoints. A research team was not used to 
ensure full personal responsibility over the data. This meant that a questionnaire was 
completed after introducing the project and researcher‟s background, emphasizing her 
position as a student of SL, also assuring full anonymity over the interview, before 
requesting consent. As many of the interviews took place in rural settings, various 
translators were used in the interviewing process.
19
 After completing surveys, interviews 
continued in conversational mode. This was due to demand, as all of the interviewees 
wanted to share their stories.
20
 If the questions in the duration of the interview were 
deemed too emotionally upsetting for the participant, the interview would stop. As there 
was no follow-up support available, interviews were only permitted to take place in a 
voluntary stable setting. The difficult decision to conduct conversational interviews was 
primarily based on the opinion that as a young researcher it would be ignorant to assume 
that one had all the answers in a simple questionnaire. 
A questionnaire format was not used whilst conducting non-victim interviews. 
                                                 
18
Doctors Without Borders (2000) 
19
They were untrained translators, but were persons recommended by interviewees that could speak fluent 
english.   
20
Often the first interview recounting their experiences to a foreigner. Registration to SLRP contains brief 
accounts of experiences. There is full list of SL victim testimonies. 
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Thorough background research, and prepared guiding questions were used when speaking 
to various candidates. However, discussion and debate were encouraged in these settings to 
allow for viewpoints to emerge and to discourage mechanic responses. Prior investigations, 
local contacts, and a research assistant aided in the pursuit of finding a varying degree of 
candidates to interview on the topic of reparations. The same procedure of debriefing was 
used in these circumstances, however anonymity was not spared, and a contact card was 
given in order to allow for further questions and/or instill a trust to the researcher.   
 
1.5.2.2 Methodological challenges 
 
The methodological challenges in the stages of conducting interviews were 
multifaceted. Objectivity of data is crucial in order to avoid scrutiny of the research, 
however, the reality is that lack of official statistics, media coverage, and conflicting 
opinions make „truth‟ difficult to find. Whilst conducting interviews there were several 
dilemmas. One particular problem was the issue of payment. Most of the victims live in 
abject poverty, therefore compensating their time at work to conduct free interviews, 
retelling their testimonies of torture, was unfavorable. However, the budget for research 
was minimal, and objectivity of data may be tampered if it could be argued that victims 
said what the researcher paid for. A decision was made to provide free lunch. This 
arrangement is common practice amongst other research teams in SL.  
 Prior to conducting field research, several ethical and practical matters had to be 
addressed to meet the needs and expectations of not just the research objective, but also the 
participants. The needs and expectations of the participants were often already 
predetermined considering that the researcher is Caucasian, young female, foreign, 
western, privileged, and inexperienced in data collection of this kind. Yet emphasis was 
placed upon the researcher as a student, unable to give financial assistance, change 
political policies, and wary of making false promises. However, it was not only the 
objectivity of the testimonies that could be compromised.  
 12 
The victims, whom were being interviewed, were subjected to grave amounts of 
torture. As an untrained psychologist, these interviews undoubtedly left their mark on the 
researcher.
21
 Gaining emotional trust from participants so that they feel comfortable 
retelling their stories was essential. Many participants became very emotional during the 
interviews, but were continuously informed that this was a voluntary interview and could 
stop at any time if too difficult. It was a fragile balancing act, because there was no 
intention of disrupting emotional states, as recounting grave incidents of trauma without 
providing a means of compensation could be damaging. Every interview was based on 
personal evaluations, conducted in a private area, and with translators briefed on their role 
in the proceedings.  
However, as “Lewis and Weigert explain, „when we see others acting in ways that 
imply they trust us, we become more inclined to reciprocate by trusting in them more.‟”22 
Even though the purpose was to be objective, and as open minded as possible, amputees 
are a victim group with an obvious disability. Their wounds are not only psychological, but 
left them unable to physically function properly. Observing scars from burns, stabbings, 
beatings, amputations, bullet wounds, and mutilations verify their stories. Their trauma 
might affect their memories as “people experience, remember and recount violence 
through the lens of their own victimization.”23 Yet, their daily realities are not discredited 
by the possible inability to recount experiences. In addition, their voice/opinions over the 
lack of sufficient reparation are crucial, because amputees are one of the main target 
groups.   
                                                 
21
No psychological support for the researcher could affect objectivity.  
22
Surviving Field Research (2009) p.73 
23
Ibid. p.155 
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1.5.3 Reviewing international and national human rights law and 
commentary 
 
In reviewing the legality of reparations, emphasis was placed on highly regarded 
instruments, documents or commentary that have been accepted internationally as a norm 
or custom as there is not yet an international treaty that directly focuses on reparations. 
There has been much study and references to reparations in international law. National 
human rights law pertaining to reparations is weak, but 5 references will be used: The 
Constitution of SL, Lomé Peace Agreement, TRC Act, TRC report, and National 
Commission Social Action (NaCSA) Act. 
 
1.5.3.1 International human rights law and commentary 
 
The below references will be used as framework for investigation in Chapter 3. 
These sources will be essential to analyzing SL‟s justification for pursuing a reparations 
program, and to determine SLRP‟s success.  
 
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims 
of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law  
 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) Art.2(3)(a): "Each State 
Party...undertakes to ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized 
are violated shall have an effective remedy...”  
 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights General Comment No.31 
Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant  
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International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(ICERD) Art.6: "States Parties shall assure to everyone within their jurisdiction effective 
protection and remedies...as well as the right to seek just and adequate reparation or 
satisfaction..."  
 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT), Art.14: "Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the 
victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate 
compensation, including the means for as full rehabilitation as possible." 
 
International Humanitarian Law based on Internal Armed Conflict is not applicable due to 
the lack of references to reparations in it.  
 
1.5.3.2 National human rights law and commentary 
 
National law and text is essential to review in establishing obligations to provide 
reparations in a timely and expedient matter. Unfortunately there are no concrete 
references to reparation for civil-war victims in SL domestic law. According to PBF‟s 
annual project report, the SLRP was amended into the NaCSA Act in 2009. However the 
official document was not available at the date of writing. There are three legal texts that 
are possible sources of reparations in domestic law. Sources are the Constitution of SL, 
Lome Peace Agreement, TRC Act of 2000, and TRC Report 2004.   
The 1991 Constitution of SL, chapter 3, provides a list of fundamental human rights 
and freedoms such as right to life, inhuman treatment, and section 28(1) allows victims of 
fundamental human rights abuses to seek redress.
24
  
The Lome Peace Agreement Article XXVI, recommends a TRC. “This Commission 
shall, among other things, recommend measures to be taken for the rehabilitation of 
                                                 
24
Constitution of SL (1991) 
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victims of human rights violations.”25 TRC Act of 200026, which mandates TRC into 
domestic law, permits TRC (in Section 15(2)), to “make recommendations concerning the 
reforms and other measures, whether legal, political, administrative or otherwise, needed to 
achieve the objective of the Commission.”27 The TRC Act does not explicitly mention 
reparations, however it lists the objective of TRC as three folded; “preventing the 
repetition of the violations or abuses suffered, responding to the needs of the victims, and 
promoting healing and reconciliation.”28 In section 6(2)(b) the Commission was required to 
“work to help restore the human dignity of victims and promote reconciliation.”29 An 
obligation to provide reparations to recognize the harm suffered could constitute a 
reparation program. The TRC report, published July 2004, acknowledges this and directly 
recommends Government to establish a reparations program.  
The TRC Report recommendation is based upon references to international law and 
commentary, and domestic law such as the constitution. To fulfill Government obligations 
to the Lome Peace Agreement, TRC recommendations must be implemented. Government 
through NaCSA launched a reparations program on the 30
th
 of January 2009.
30
 Displaying 
the TRC Report‟s legal influence and legally binding nature.    
 
1.6 Structure of thesis 
 
The thesis is organized in a manner to provide a balanced discussion of what 
„reparation‟ entails from a theoretical and practical viewpoint in SL. Chapter 1 introduces 
the reader to the objective and justification of research, while describing the methods and 
means of attempting to answer research questions. Chapter 2 reviews the background of 
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SL‟s conflict and the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms such as the TRC and 
SLRP in order to describe the purpose for having a reparation program in SL. Chapter 3 
looks at the concept of victim reparations. International law and commentary and 
justification for reparation will be analyzed. By reviewing the reasons for reparation we 
can then analyze what determines successful reparation programs. Chapter 4 looks at 
SLRP‟s working definitions, structure and benefits, before specifically addressing 
amputees. Reparations and their implications will then be analyzed from a practical 
standpoint. Chapter 5 provides amputee victim testimonies, and an assessment of their 
current situation, as a means of drawing the abstract concept of reparations into a real 
context. Chapter 5 will analyze if Basic Principles objectives have been fulfilled, and what 
challenges face SLRP. Concluding remarks and comments will then be made in Chapter 7 
referring also to restrictions and future implications of this thesis.   
 17 
2 Sierra Leone 
 
Map 1 Sierra Leone
31
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SL lies on the west coast of Africa, sharing borders with Guinea and Liberia 
neighboring countries that have also experienced recent or ongoing conflict. Diamonds, 
titanium ore, bauxite (primary source of aluminum), iron ore, gold, chromite, and rutile are 
some of the extremely rare and valuable natural resources that SL has. Yet 70% of the 
population remains under the poverty line, making it alongside its neighbors, one of the 
poorest countries in the world. Within SL‟s extreme poverty, there is tremendous 
inequality in income distribution. This is because even though it  
possesses substantial mineral, agricultural, and fishery resources, its physical and 
social infrastructure is not well developed, and serious social disorders continue to 
hamper economic development…The fate of the economy depends upon the 
maintenance of domestic peace and the continued receipt of substantial aid from 
abroad, which is essential to offset the severe trade imbalance and supplement 
government revenues.
32
  
 
Unfortunately, SL ranks very poorly on world rankings for corruption
33
, life expectancy at 
39 years
34
, GDP per capita $900
35
, and is even described by the UNDP as one of the worst 
places to live
36
 However, means and measures by the new government elected in 2007
37
 
are directed at tackling widespread corruption
38
, and making SL attractive to investors.
39
 
For now, SL is dependent on donors, for around half of its annual budget, and is more or 
less as poor and undeveloped as it was after the war ended.
40
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2.1 Background to the conflict in Sierra Leone 
 
23
rd
 March 1991 marked the beginning of the civil war in SL.
41
 Forces calling 
themselves the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) crossed the border from Liberia into SL 
from the east, “heralding the beginning of a decade of violence that devastated the 
country”.42 The declared main purpose of the RUF was to overthrow the corrupt and 
tyrannical government of the political group All Peoples Congress (APC) which had ruled 
since 1968.
43
 The goals of the RUF were shared views of many Sierra Leoneans. “Many 
were frustrated by years of dictatorship and by the descending spiral of poverty and 
underdevelopment…”44 However, these aspirations lost legitimacy as soon civilians 
became targets of the “worst forms of human rights abuses.”45 Several armed groups were 
involved in the conflict. Even though the TRC found the “RUF to have been responsible 
for the largest number of human rights violations”, all parties to the conflict were guilty of 
directly targeting civilians.
46
 This made it difficult to distinguish different armed groups 
from each other, making the fighting politically senseless. The fighting was officially 
declared over in 2002, after three failed attempts at peace processes.
47
 The formal 
beginning of the end of the conflict was the Lome Peace Agreement of 7 July 1999 
instigated after a devastating attack called “Operation No Living Thing” left Freetown in 
ruins.
48
 The name, “No Living Thing” itself demonstrates how unnervingly violent this 
conflict was. “A death toll of around 50,000 did not tell the full story of a conflict where 
much of the fighting was carried out at close quarters.”49  
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2.1.1 Nature of conflict and atrocities 
 
The nature of the conflict in SL seems to be linked to directly and purposely violating 
laws of war and disrespecting any international law by all parties. Civilians were directly 
targeted in brutal campaigns of terror, transforming them into objects of war. “The 
overwhelming majority of atrocities were committed by Sierra Leoneans against Sierra 
Leoneans. The conflict was essentially self-destructive in character.”50  
  Amputation, forced cannibalism, abduction, forced recruitment, sexual slavery, 
drugging, forced labor, assault, torture, rape, arbitrary detention, looting and destruction of 
property, extortion, forced displacement, killing, and cannibalism are the different 
categories of violations that the TRC have recognized.
51
 Often civilians were victims to 
more than one of these violations at the same time, or at different time periods of the war. 
Of those that reported to the TRC, 23% of reported victims of forced recruitment, rape and 
sexual slavery were children under the age of 13.
52
 2 million people were internally 
displaced after the war, out of the total population figure of 4.5 million.
53
 The full extent of 
the brutality will never be understood, as before SLRP‟s registration process there were 
only meager, and undeveloped victim statistics available. The registration of victims is 
therefore an extremely challenging process.  
According to ICTJ, NaCSA has registered 1,285 amputees in SL.
54
 The head of 
AWWA, Alhaji Jusu Jarka, estimates that 1 out of 5 amputee victims managed to survive, 
and current numbers are dwindling due to extreme poverty, suicide and high risk of 
disease.
55
 All armed groups participated in amputating limbs as a means of instilling fear. 
However, amputations were not a constant feature of the prosecution of the war but used in 
campaigns. For example leading up to the election in 1996, the RUF terrorized civilians, 
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and used amputations as a symbol of taking away their ability to vote, because “how will 
you vote with no hands”.56 Lack of immediate medical assistance meant many victims died 
shortly afterwards, whilst those who survived managed to go hours, days or, in rare cases, 
weeks without proper medical attention.
57
 On the 22
nd
 of February 2000, the SL Parliament 
established a TRC “to create an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of 
human rights…to respond to the needs of the victims and to promote healing and 
reconciliation…”58 
 
2.1.2 Establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission  
 
The Lomé Peace Agreement of 7
th
 July 1999, between the Government of SL and 
the Revolutionary United Front of SL pledged the establishment of a TRC to be set up 
within ninety days. The TRC was a creation of the Parliament of SL through the TRC 
Act
59
, but financing came from international donors (even though initially budgeted for 
10million dollars it only received 4million dollars
60
). Inspired by other TRCs around the 
world, its agenda was to address key questions surrounding the war and report atrocities, 
and to “recommend measures to be taken for the rehabilitation of victims of human rights 
violations.”61 The report issued in 2004, was presented to the government and people of SL 
to provide “introspection and a retrospective examination of the political, historical, 
economical, social and moral activities of both the state and the nation”62 in order to 
prevent the war from ever reoccurring. Under section 17 of the TRC Act:   
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[t]he Government shall faithfully and timeously implement the recommendations 
of the report that are directed to state bodies and encourage or facilitate the 
implementation of any recommendations that may be directed to others.
63
 
      
The implementation of TRC recommendations is an indicator of Government‟s 
commitment to upholding its obligations under the Lome Peace Agreement, thus vital in 
demonstrating Government‟s long-term commitment to upholding peace in SL.  
 
2.1.3 Establishment of Sierra Leone’s Reparations Program 
  
One of the recommendations of the TRC was to create a reparation program, but 
only for those victims who were particularly vulnerable “because of the human rights 
violations they had suffered and the harm that they continued to live with.”64 However, to 
achieve a reparative effect on victims, reparations have to be provided by the Government 
whilst acknowledging and recognizing violations. 7707 statements were received by the 
TRC, and by carrying out a random sampling of statements the needs of victims were 
identified and ranked. Socio-economic rights such as housing, education, and health were 
of primary concern for victims in the poll. However victim needs must be balanced out 
against feasibility of the program. Therefore the reparations program was limited to 
victims who are in urgent need of assistance such as amputees, war wounded, sexual abuse 
victims, and special categories of children. Their injuries must have been occurred from 23 
March 1991 up until 1 March 2002.
65
  
 Based on these recommendations, the Government of SL, through NaCSA (the 
agency allocated responsibility for implementation) launched its reparation program on 
30
th
 of January 2009.
66
  
The program will largely focus on the rehabilitation of victims through the delivery 
of social service packages and symbolic measures which acknowledge the past, the 
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harm done to victims, and empower them to rebuild their lives.
67   
   
The benefits for the most vulnerable victims will be within the following areas: healthcare, 
education, skills training and microcredit, pensions, micro grants, fistula surgery, 
psychosocial support, housing, community and symbolic reparations, but since most of 
these require further planning and additional resources they will be delayed until more 
planning is complete and funding is provided. Even so, The SLRP has promised more 
basic measures to be put in place within the first year (2009) of the launch. Different 
victim categories will receive different benefits under their scheme depending on the 
nature of their injury or disability.
68
 Chapter 4 will provide a description of the amputee 
victim group‟s provisions and applicability.  
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3 Victim reparations 
 
In international law states have obligations to pay reparations for breaches of their 
legal obligations.
69
 The same concept applies in international human rights law. States 
have obligations to pay reparations for breaches of their legal obligations to individuals, 
because human rights provide individuals protection under international law.
70
 However, 
reparation as a concept is “not settled either in theory or in practice”.71 Their content may 
be unclear, even though there is “broad agreement that victims of international core crimes 
have a right to reparations.”72 Having said this, reparations have been interpreted into the 
legal systems of the world, and various approaches to the form and procedure of reparation 
payments exist.
73
 For the purposes of this thesis, Chapter 3 will first investigate the concept 
and justifications for reparations. Then it will look at generally challenges and means of 
assessing reparations program. Working definitions from SL will be presented in Chapter 
4.   
 
3.1 International concept of reparations 
 
Official definitions clarify obligations, but in order to understand the purpose of 
providing reparations it is necessary to explore their roots, albeit briefly due to the 
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limitations of the thesis. The aim of this thesis is to assess if it is possible to apply 
international concepts of reparations to SL.  
The concept of reparations has a long history if looked at from international law 
between warring states. Yet reparations by states to individuals relates to the more recent 
development of human rights law. “Human Rights Instruments generally refer to the 
obligation of states to provide effective remedies for human rights violations.”74 It can 
often be mixed in with other transitional justice measures.
75
 The broad use of the term 
reparations furthers its perplexity. However, in this thesis we will work from its most 
simple form by recognizing that reparations are the act of correcting a wrong. Reparations 
ideally should restitute. The aim of restitution is to restore the situation that existed before 
the wrongful act was committed.
76
  
Human rights law is a normative context.  The official definitions show that victims and 
their supporters are favored in their insistence that reparations are a part of a “new political 
regime of „fairness‟”.77 In human rights Law a breach of an individual‟s rights “gives rise 
to an obligation to make reparation.”78 As seen in the Basic Principles this grave “violation 
of internationally recognized human rights, sees that the state has a responsibility to make 
just and adequate reparation to all persons within the jurisdiction of the offending state.”79 
The failure to do so implies loss of state commitment to important individual (and victim) 
protection rights.
80
  
Reparations are validated if we choose to recognize and protect human rights. Not only 
validation from past injury, but also in “the present recognition and legitimation of 
                                                 
74
Shelton (2005) p.8 
75
DeGreiff (2006) p.13 
76
Gillard (2003) p.531 
77
Falk (2006) p.497 
78
Gillard (2003) p.530 
79
Pete and Plessis (2007) p.14 
80
Teitel (2000) p.125 
 27 
individual property and bodily security rights.”81 In this same sense, Brandon Hamber 
expresses that: 
There should not be anything in a reparations program that invites either their 
designers or their beneficiaries to interpret them as an effort to put a price on the 
life of victims or on the experiences of horror. Rather, they should be interpreted as 
making a contribution to the quality of life of survivors. Forward looking 
perspective.
82
  
 
Reparations do not make violations disappear. “No matter what the motive, all reparation 
strategies face this intractable problem.”83 Yet, they can ameliorate by aiding individuals to 
proceed with their lives. Through reparations, recognition and validation allow victims to 
reenter their communities. Even though human rights are most needed when they are under 
threat, the impact of rights has a deep psychological effect. Empowerment, security, and 
validation allow individuals to develop and prosper. Therefore duties to address violations 
are important to securing and protecting international human rights norms.  
In the late twentieth century, there was an “unprecedented development and 
codification of international legal standards for the protection of individuals in the form of 
human rights instruments.”84 Along with these treaties, was the establishment of various 
human rights courts and committees. Individual cases that have reached various 
international bodies only have the jurisdiction to address the violations presented to it. 
However, with each decision the general law supporting reparations evolves and is 
strengthened if a breach gives rise to reparation.  Reparations thus become an “important 
part of enforcement and can play a significant role in deterring future violations.”85 The 
general law supporting reparations is also strengthened because it has been broadly agreed 
that “victims of international core crimes have a right to reparations due to the injuries that 
they have suffered.”86 The former Special Rapparteur, Theo van Boven, articulates that the 
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Basic Principles could be derived from international norms found in human rights, 
international humanitarian law, and norms in the area of crime prevention and criminal 
justice.
87
 Provision of reparation has then a sound legal basis. The detailed expositions of 
the different forms that reparations may take would also be supported through customary 
usage.
88
  
The importance of providing reparations can be seen through the needs of victims. 
Often the violations were of a physical nature (as seen with the amputees), and thus hinder 
those individuals from positively developing. “They may need long-term medical care, 
may no longer be able to earn an income and are likely to have lost home and belongings.
89
 
The reparation itself does not „rectify‟ a wrong, but a “compensated wrong is generally 
preferable to an uncompensated wrong.”90 Context plays an important role. It is the merit 
of an individual‟s violation that drives reparations. Reparations exist in international law. 
Nevertheless, individuals are subjected to various violations and their redress must be 
reflected on an individual‟s basis. Justification for reparation will therefore be addressed 
in-depth in the following section. However, it should be noted that due to the nature of 
reparations a strong overlap between concept and justification exists.   
 
3.2 International justifications of reparations 
 
As seen in the previous section, victim reparations have a sound legal basis through 
theory and practice. Nevertheless, justification does not derive purely from international 
agreement. Human rights is a discipline which can be justified by multiple means. 
Although there are many means to justify reparations, due to the thesis limitations only two 
will be addressed. Section 3.2.1 will look at the legal justification of reparation, and 
Section 3.2.2 will do the same in regards to socio political justifications.  
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3.2.1 Legal justification for reparations 
  
 Law determines what is just in society. These are self-imposed restrictions by states 
and individuals determining the function of a society. Justice is administered when 
deserved punishment is granted in violations of rights provided by law. Reparations are 
essentially tools used to uphold justice. There are domestic laws determining social 
constructions, and international laws determining appropriate state behavior towards other 
states and towards individuals. There are both positive and negative rights within both 
frameworks. When domestic laws fail to protect individuals, international law provides a 
guiding framework to provide for the lack of justice. Firstly in this section there will be a 
brief analysis of the Basic Principles, before looking at various UN bodies‟ responses to 
reparations. These instruments are constructed and used by the international community 
when determining reparations. 
 The Basic Principles were adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 
60/147 of 16 December 2005. They were initiated in 1988 by the UN Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities
91
, and were the result of 15 
years of extensive work. The Basic Principles are “based on the assumption that, while 
international legal obligation in this respect are put into place in existing instruments of 
human rights and humanitarian law, the same obligations still find insufficient 
application.”92 In order to re-emphasize a right to remedy, the preamble of the Basic 
Principles stresses that “the international community keeps faith and human solidarity with 
the victims, survivors and future human generations, and reaffirms the international legal 
principles of accountability, justice and the rule of law.”93 Taking into consideration that 
resolutions are not binding documents, the Basic Principles do not recommend new 
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obligations. Instead they attempt to clarify and reaffirm the obligations already set forth in 
various conventions regarding reparations.
94
  
Providing reparation is based on upholding the international norm for protection of 
human dignity. The grave nature of gross violations of international human rights law 
“constitutes an affront to human dignity.”95 Therefore, “victims should be treated with 
compassion and respect for their dignity, have their right to access to justice and redress 
mechanisms fully respected…”96 Obligations to compensate violations, “right to remedy”97 
are stipulated in every human rights treaty, stressing the importance of reparations 
contribution to the justiciability of human rights. If there is no fall back mechanisms for 
victims, human rights lose their legitimacy.  
 The right to remedy is already an integral part of international law. It is contained 
in global and regional human rights treaties and other instruments. Humanitarian law 
instruments, as well as the statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) make 
provision for reparations to victims of international crimes.
98
 “Declarations, resolutions 
and other non-treaty texts adopted by the UN Human Rights Charter-based and treaty 
bodies also address the right to remedy.”99 The right to remedy itself is constructed two 
fold by negative and positive obligations. Negatively the right to remedy includes the 
“procedural right of access to justice.”100 Positively it contains the “substantive right to 
redress for injury suffered because of an act or acts committed in violations of rights 
contained in national or international law.”101 Due to the nature of violations, nearly all UN 
treaty bodies have noted or emphasized the right to reparations.
102
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An example being the Human Rights Committee adopting General Comment 31 
(GC 31) on Article 2 of the ICCPR on April 21, 2004, entitled “Nature of the General 
Legal Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant.”103  Article 2 of the ICCPR addresses 
the obligations of the state party to the treaty, and refers directly to reparation.  
To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are 
violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been 
committed by persons acting in an official capacity.
104
     
      
The GC reaffirms the negative and positive nature of this right.
105
 States are also reminded 
in the GC para. 8 of the “interrelationship between the positive obligations imposed under 
article 2 and the need to provide effective remedies in the event of a breach.”106 Although, 
effective remedy is already stated in article 2 of ICCPR, the GC also stipulates the duty to 
“provide for and implement provisional or interim measures to avoid continuing violations 
and to endeavour to repair at the earliest possible opportunity any harm that may have been 
caused by such violations.”107 Special Rappateurs appointed by the Commission on Human 
Rights agree: “The right of victims or their families to receive fair and adequate 
compensation within a reasonable period of time.”108 If the state parties do not “ensure to 
individuals accessible, effective and enforceable remedies to vindicate their rights”109, the 
obligation to provide an effective remedy is not discharged. The comment finds that 
remedy can also include restitution, rehabilitation, and measures of satisfaction, such as 
“public apologies, public memorials, guarantees of non-repetition, and changes in relevant 
laws and practices, as wells as bringing to justice the perpetrators of human rights 
violations.”110 Even though many would agree that both the Basic Principles as well as 
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GCs are not hard law, there are many common aspects to the approach taken towards 
reparations by UN bodies.  
 In all references to reparations in the UN there is a strong affirmation of the right of 
access to justice.
111
 There is also the common stipulation that “substantive reparations are a 
right of victims, but that the nature and the scope of the reparations will vary according to 
the nature of the violation and needs of the victims.”112 Providing reparations for gross and 
systematic violations could “overwhelm the best efforts to provide redress due to the large 
numbers of victims and perpetrators.”113 Identification, registration, compensation 
procedures are all dependent on the host states ability and commitment to provide 
reparations. Even though, there is a “firm articulation of a legal obligation to afford 
adequate reparation to all victims of gross human rights violations”114 remedies may have 
to be adjusted to achieve full effect. This in turn reinforces the weakness of the 
applicability of reparations. States could reject responsibility based on weak national 
structures to accommodate reparations. As we will see in the next section, providing 
reparations are not only to uphold obligations to international obligations. Reparations 
provide a symbolic value to states relations towards its people.   
 
3.2.2 Socio political justifications for reparations 
 
 Reparations are important for a society emerging from violence. “Reparations are a 
deep interpersonal and social barometer for victims.”115 They serve as a „signal‟ to victims 
that their grief, anger and feelings of injustice are validated by society. Reparations allow 
for victims to feel included in their respective society, and not sidelined or disregarded as 
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un-equals. “Without social recognition of their suffering…they run the risk of continuing 
to exist only in their „internal world‟ where it can be acute and isolating.”116  
Christian Tomuschat adds that since human rights violations frequently occur in 
poor countries it is impossible to compensate all victims in full. The greater scope and 
scale of violations often means the less likely that the victims will be adequately 
compensated.
117
 The poorer the country also implies that the victims are in more of a 
vulnerable position as often they lack government assistance or private insurances. Taking 
into perspective that “substantial material assistance does not „bring back the dead‟, nor are 
they guaranteed to converge with, and ameliorate, all the levels of psychological pain 
suffered,”118 repairing the irreparable may then seem like an impossible task. Yet, 
reparations can be viewed as a symbolic act of diverging from the past. Recognition, 
acceptance of past acts, and a dedication to move forward are important to change the 
public perception of government. Trust in government then allows for stability and 
development.  Reparations then have a rehabilitative effect upon the entire society and not 
only beneficiaries.  
 
3.3 Challenges for reparation programs 
 
Whilst reviewing the Basic Principles several potential challenges concerning their 
application were identified. The main requirements articulated in the Basic Principles are 
“adequate, effective and prompt reparation”119. My opinion is that many seen and 
unforeseen variables play a role in effecting the establishment of an adequate, effective and 
prompt reparation program. This section will analyze these 3 main principles, and what 
would/could be potential variables to take into account when implementing a reparation 
program.  
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 Adequacy of reparations is prescribed in the Basic Principles themselves. 
“Reparation should be proportional to the gravity of the violations and the harmed 
suffered.”120 Terminology like “restore the victim to the original situation before the gross 
violation”121 shapes adequacy. Loaded words such as „proportional‟ and „restore‟ are 
poignant. Yet, victims can be the only judges of adequate. Reparations achieving justice in 
the terms of „restore‟ and „proportionate‟ then seem challenging. On a practical dimension, 
granting victims‟ justice for gross and systematic violations is a burdensome task.  
As seen in the previous section, poorer income countries often have numerous 
human rights violations. Developing and sustaining reparations programs to Basic 
Principles standards can become overwhelming. States in transition from violent situations 
are often devastated economically and structurally by war. A massive compensation 
scheme during a time of transition is a difficult commitment. This is largely affected by the 
political will of the Government. It requires legitimate dedication and effort by the host 
government to institute such change. A reparation program can be political suicide for a 
Government in this position, because policies that have a transformative effect on the 
majority of the population are more favorable. Therefore lack of legitimate political will is 
the main challenge for establishing effective reparation schemes.  
On a practical scale, the execution of an effective reparation scheme is determined 
by the abilities and resources the reparation program has. Funding is a major issue. Poor 
countries have difficulty finding funds for adequate compensation. Funds affect the quality 
of the administration and structures required for initiating and sustaining reparation 
programs. International funding may be a viable option, but often comes with strict 
conditions that are difficult to meet. There is also a danger of relying too heavily on 
donors, as could effect perceptions of national ownership. Domestic funding is determined 
on political will as well as economic restrictions.  
The planning stage of reparations is dependent on massive investigation, 
identification, and administrative work. All potential beneficiaries must be identified, and 
verified. This is extremely time consuming and complex. Reparation staff must also be 
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trained in taking statements, verifying information and recording findings onto a database. 
Problems in this stage can be double witness statements, fictitious victims, amongst other 
forms of mismanagement and corruption. Efficiency is dependent on practical problems 
that are often difficult to foresee and handle.  
The implementation and execution stage has also serious challenges. Providing the 
benefits determined at the planning stage is dependent on outreach strategies. Beneficiaries 
may be in rural communities making it difficult for them to access information on 
payments, or have access to reparation officials.  For gross and systematic violations, the 
system is often overburdened and overwhelmed with beneficiaries. Transparent and 
concise benefits may then be delayed due to procedural overloads. Therefore the exchange 
of information between various reparation programs to identify potential problems is 
essential.  
Prompt reparation is linked to adequacy and efficiency. Prioritizing victims is 
referred to in the Basic Principles. Governments are encouraged to implement reparation 
programs immediately to satisfy the needs of the victims. Morally this is a plausible 
standpoint. However, combined with providing adequate and efficient reparations, 
governments have a daunting task. It would be more plausible to state that governments are 
obliged to avoid unsatisfactory delays and speedily move ahead with construction of the 
reparation program. A problem noted with the SLRP.  
 
3.4 Means of assessing success of reparation programs 
 
There are many ways to assess reparation programs. The Basic Principles are 
considered to have the status of “soft law” since they are not legally binding, but constitute 
the beginning of a “process of institutionalization and international involvement in the 
issue of reparations, the rights of victims, and the design and implementation of specific 
reparation programs.”122 Therefore the Basic Principles will be used as a valid starting 
point to assess reparation programs.  
                                                 
122
Garcia-Godos (2008) p.116 
 36 
 Reparations are essentially determined to be victim oriented. Therefore states, no 
matter the context, should have a focus on victims. Since the Basic Principles are victim 
oriented the focus of providing reparations should be of similar nature.  
Victims should be treated with humanity and respect for their dignity and human 
rights, and appropriate measures should be taken to ensure their safety, physical 
and psychological well-being and privacy, as well as those of their families. The 
State should ensure that its domestic laws, to the extent possible, provide that a 
victim who has suffered violence or trauma should benefit from special 
consideration and care to avoid his or re-traumatization in the course of legal and 
administrative procedures designed to provide justice and reparation.”123 
 
Assessing reparation programs will be based on what conditions victims find themselves in 
before and after the start of a reparation program. Is the program directly responsible to 
improving the quality of life for sufferers? Has the condition of victims improved or 
“restored to the original situation before the gross violation”124? In order to answer these 
questions there will be an assessment of the SLRP in Chapter 4, and victim conditions in 
Chapter 5, with a more comprehensive look in Chapter 6 at reaching “adequate, effective 
and prompt reparation” principles in SLRP.  
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4 Sierra Leones Reparation Program 
 
Chapter 4 will focus on the structure of the SLRP and the proposed benefits for 
amputees. Before doing this SL‟s working definitions of victims, and reparations have to 
be established. This chapter will demonstrate the problems associated with fulfilling SL‟s 
legal obligations when  applying international legal standards to national practice.  
 
4.1 Victims vs. beneficiaries in Sierra Leone 
 
A victim, according to the Basic Principles is:   
(a) A person who individually or collectively suffered harm, including 
physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss, or impairment of 
their fundamental rights, as a result of acts or omissions that constitute a gross 
violation of international human rights law, or serious violations of international 
humanitarian law; 
 
(b)  A person, who in intervening to assist a victim or prevent the occurrence 
of further violations, suffers physical, mental, or economic harm; 
 
(c)  In accordance with domestic law, a legal person, the representative of a 
victim, a dependant or a member of the immediate family or household of the 
direct victim.  
 
 A person‟s status as a victim should not depend on whether the perpetrator 
of the violation has been identified, apprehended, prosecuted, or convicted.
125
 
      
The TRC report uses a similar definition based on international law: 
A person is a „victim‟ where as a result of acts or omissions that constitute a 
violation of international human rights and humanitarian law norms, that person, 
individually or collectively, suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, 
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emotional suffering, economic loss, or impairment of that person‟s fundamental 
legal rights. A „victim‟ may also be a dependant or a member of the immediate 
family or household of the direct victim as well as a person who, in intervening to 
assist a victim or prevent the occurrence of further violations, has suffered 
physical, mental or economic harm.
126
  
       
Yet according to the TRC and SLRP, all victims cannot be the beneficiaries of a reparation 
program.
127
 The violation of human rights must have been between 1991 and 2002. Abuses 
must have been committed on SL territory.
128
 A reparation program is not intended to pass 
judgment on previous actions, but rather focus on what violations have occurred. However, 
ex-combatants have already benefited from several programs, such as the Disarmament, 
Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) developed in conjunction with UNAMSIL. 
Therefore, restoring the imbalance between benefits already assigned to ex-combatants and 
reparations for the victims is one of the purposes of the reparations program.
129
 All victims 
must be a civilian and not a member of a fighting force at the time of abuse.
130
 Avoiding 
double benefits would be essential to target the sense of injustice felt by many victims due 
to preferential treatment of ex-combatants.   
The context and the economic reality that SL finds itself really shape what the TRC 
recommends as reparations
131
, but also uses to define beneficiaries. It is the extent of 
vulnerability that defines beneficiaries: Those victims “who are particularly vulnerable 
because of the human rights violations they suffered and the harm that they continue to live 
with.”132 Five different categories of victims fell under this definition in the TRC report: 
 Amputees: Victims who lost their upper or lower limbs as a result of the conflict. 
Other War Wounded: Victims who have become temporarily or permanently 
physically disabled, either totally or partially, as a consequence of the conflict, and 
who as a result have experienced a 50 % or more reduction in earning capacity. 
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Victims of Sexual Violence:  women and girls who were subjected to such acts as 
rape, sexual slavery, mutilation of genital parts or breast, and forced marriages. To 
the extent boys and men suffered from sexual violence, they will also be 
beneficiaries of reparations.  
Children: Children who suffered from physical injury, such as amputees, other 
war wounded or victims of sexual violence. Children who suffered from 
psychological harm, and war wounded.  
War widows: Women whose husbands (civilians) were killed as a consequence of any 
abuse or violation and who, as a result, have become the primary breadwinners for their 
families.
133
 
 
According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), child victims, must have 
parents that died as civilians as a result of abuses, or the child must be born out of sexual 
violence.
134
 It should be noted that victims who may have been severely psychologically 
damaged, but are not physically harmed will not receive reparation. This may be due to the 
lack of attention to psychological trauma throughout the country. Narrowing the victim 
scope in this manner serves to address the economic necessity of the most vulnerable 
victims. According to TRC‟s report the narrow scope is a direct consequence of the limited 
resources of SL.  
The SLRP used the same categories as the TRC in its registration. This means that 
victim beneficiaries are defined in the SLRP on the basis of what is politically and 
economically feasible as a state. SLRP does not identify beneficiaries by solely their legal 
merit of being victims. They must be in an extremely vulnerable position. Defining 
beneficiaries based on vulnerability is a more political definition than a judicial definition. 
In the sense that politics defines priorities, for example the Government decides national 
budgets and policies. SL „chose‟ to only provide reparation to a limited number of victims. 
Politically, it would be difficult for a Government in its position, to have political support 
if priorities and the budget focused solely on providing reparation to victims. It seems 
politically feasible to provide reparations to a small manageable group. In this way, SL can 
address needs of the most vulnerable, somewhat fulfilling its international obligations. 
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4.2 Sierra Leone’s definition of reparations  
 
 The most established definition of reparations can be found in the Basic Principles: 
In accordance with domestic law and international law, and taking account of 
individual circumstances, victims of gross violations of international human rights 
law and serious violations of international humanitarian law should be provided, as 
appropriate and proportional to the gravity of the violation and the circumstances 
of each case, with full and effective reparation, including the following forms: 
restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-
repetition and prevention.
135
 
       
The proposed benefits of the SLRP are rehabilitative in nature. This is because they consist 
of micro grants, free physical healthcare, education, and housing for the most vulnerable.  
Rehabilitative is the terminology the Lome Peace Agreement and TRC recommended and 
the SLRP implemented.  
The Program will largely focus on the rehabilitation of victims through the 
delivery of social service packages and symbolic measures which acknowledge the 
past, the harm done to victims, and empower them to rebuild their lives.
136
  
 
In a sense they allow vulnerable victims to continue with their lives, but do not necessarily 
restore “the victim to the original situation”137 like stated in the Basic Principles. Rather 
the SLRP uses the term “restoring dignity”.138 Implying that the nature of reparations 
provided by the SLRP aim to provide opportunities for victims to be self-sustainable. As 
opposed to providing direct compensation for effects of the violation.  
Rehabilitative means that these social services take into account the handicapping 
nature of violations. Concretely acknowledging their rights, instead of purely providing 
symbolic reparations.
139
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4.3 Legal and institutional structure of Sierra Leones Reparation Program 
 
In order to fulfill its obligations to the Lome Peace Agreement, the Government must 
implement the recommendations of the TRC.
140
 The TRC made extensive 
recommendations for government sponsored reparation measures for the most vulnerable 
victims. It encouraged NaCSA to establish a sub-unit within three months of the launch of 
its report published in 2004, and to start implementation of the most urgent reparations 
within six months.
141
 In response, a year after the publication, in June 2005 the SL 
Government issued a White Paper on the proposed recommendations.
142
 Concluding that: 
Will use its best endeavors to ensure the full and timely implementation of various 
reparations programs recommended by the Commission, subject to the means 
available to the State, taking into consideration the resources available to it and 
assistance received from the international community and the countries mentioned in 
the Report.
143
 
 
Instead of immediate implementation of the TRC recommendations, the White Paper only 
expressed commitment subject to the means available to the state. A year later, on 8 
September 2006, a government directive approved NaCSA as the implementing body of 
the reparations program. NaCSA is a social fund established in November 2001 by an Act 
of Parliament. The NaCSA Act was amended in 2009 to include a reparations program.
144
 
They were chosen because it is the governmental organization that funds projects that 
“promote sustainable development leading to the alleviation of poverty, reduction in the 
risk of renewed conflict and improvement in the well-being of Sierra Leoneans.”145 
NaCSA‟s mandate was extended to 2018.146 By allocating responsibility to NaCSA, the 
Government does not have to create a new organization. This would require extensive 
resources and infrastructure. However, not creating a new organization can imply that a 
                                                 
140
Kargbo (2010) 
141
AI Report (2007)  p.22 
142
AI Report (2007)  p.22 
143
Ibid. 
144
[SL-PBF] Annual Report (2009) 
145
SLIS (2008) 
146
[SL-PBF] Annual Report (2009) 
 42 
reparations program is not deserving of much attention, or is „hidden‟ in the government 
agenda.  
The Government also established a Reparations Task Force (RTF)
147
, which included 
representatives from NaCSA, the Vice President‟s office, TRC, victims‟ associations, and 
civil society.
148
 Their task was to advise on the establishment of a Special Fund for War 
Victims (SFWV) and the implementation of a Reparations Program in the country. The 
aim of creating the SLRP was to “uphold the status of victims as bearers of rights and 
convey the sense that it is on this basis that they are owed reparations for harms suffered, 
and indignities endured.”149 The SLRP was also intended to “reinforce Government‟s 
commitment to meeting both its legal obligations and fundamental socio-economic and 
human rights of its citizens.”150 (According to Amnesty International, there were no 
women, or women‟s organizations represented in the task force.151 If true, when two large 
victim groups consist of women this is alarming.) In May 2007, the RTF submitted a 
proposal to the Government to create the SLRP.
152
  
However, it was March 2008 before the Government in partnership with NaCSA, 
IOM and funded by PBF produced a project document proposing the establishment of a 
Reparations Unit within NaCSA using strategies and plans developed by the RTF.
153
 In 
August 2008, the Government undertook a Year-One Project aimed at “building the 
institutional capacity needed to implement the TRC recommendations”154, and “meeting its 
obligation in the Lome Peace Agreement.”155 According to the ICTJ, strict funding 
conditionalities, tens of thousands of potential reparation beneficiaries, and unexpected 
delays meant none of the project‟s objectives was fully completed within the initial one-
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year time frame. “Nor was it ever likely or probable that they would be accomplished.”156 
However, the PBF Annual Project Narrative, submitted by IOM, stated that all project 
outcomes were fully achieved.
157
 This implies that there is disagreement concerning the 
success of outputs, which will be reviewed in later sections. 
Within December 2009, 29,733 were entered into the victim database, and out of the 
20,107 eligible for payments, only 750 were no show during the payment window to 
receive the micro-grants and educational support offered.
158
 Even though a five year 
strategy had been developed within 2009
159
 the reparations program is heavily reliant upon 
international funding for long-term sustainability. The head of NaCSA, Commissioner 
Saidu Conton Sesay, has expressed concern for the future of the reparations program: “The 
government has the responsibility of providing these but its resources are very limited. We 
need external support to help the victims and to consolidate peace.”160  
The reparation program was established through policy directives streamlining the 
activities of the SLRP into Line Ministries‟ activities.161 This is could be cause for concern 
as there is no legal structure to empower these victims that fall into these categories with a 
„right to remedy‟. NaCSA is a social fund. If there is no money put into this social fund for 
reparations, these victims have no other options for receiving reparations. There seems to 
be no fall back mechanisms if the SLRP fails at providing reparation. (It is also unclear if 
these victims could go to court to claim for reparations. As one of the reasons for creating 
SLRP was because the SL justice system does not have the capacity to deal with massive 
violations through courts.
162
) Victims, then, seem to be charitable objects of a development 
project, and lack rights to reparation. The exact opposite of SLRP‟s objective to “restore 
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dignity”163. In addition, it dangerously reinforces vulnerability and dependency on state 
mechanisms which has failed them before. 
NaCSA‟s mandate as a social fund ends in 2018. As SLRP is under NaCSA‟s 
mandate, it will also end in 2018, if not extended. It is questionable if eight years would be 
enough time to complete the reparation program. According to Buya Kamara the Director 
of SLRP, 8 years would be enough time to meet emergency health care needs, and skills 
training. However, education and pension requires a longer implementation period flexible 
to individual victim needs.
164
 A time extension could be challenging as NaCSA‟s mandate 
can only be extended through parliament. Therefore it is reliant on the priorities of the 
government at that time. 
Even within the eight years, reparation is reliant on the commitment of the 
Government to provide victims with lifetime support mechanisms through a social fund. 
However, the current Government has expressed keen interest to implement the TRC 
recommendations and especially the reparations program.
165
 Yet even with commitment, 
problems of finding funding have been a grave challenge, causing delays and cutbacks. 
Thus, even though there might be a „right to remedy‟ in international law for victims, as 
established in Chapter 3, it is unclear if SL fulfills its international obligations by relying 
so heavily on donor participation.    
 
4.4 Funding of Sierra Leones Reparation Program 
 
The biggest challenge for the SLRP is funding. Therefore, this section will look at 
the proposed funding sources in the recommendations of the TRC, against the current 
funding sources of the SLRP.  
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4.4.1 Special Fund for War Victims 
 
Section 7(6) of the TRC Act called upon the TRC to make recommendations for the 
use of the SFWV stipulated in Article XXIX of the Lome Peace Agreement.
166
  
The Government, with the support of the International Community, shall design 
and implement a program for the rehabilitation of war victims. For this purpose, 
a special fund shall be set up.
167
 
 
The TRC report recommends the Government to create, collect and solicit funds for the 
SFWV. It should be implemented no later than three months after the handover of the TRC 
report, and SFWV is to be used to implement its proposed reparation program.
168
 TRC 
report also recommends that contributions, financial or otherwise, for the establishment of 
a SFWV should be provided by Government.
169
 Government is recommended to prioritize 
reparations in their budget, provide a reparations tax, designate revenue generated from 
mineral sources (such as according to Article VII of the Lome Peace Agreement), find 
donor support, seize assets from convicted persons, insist that perpetrators assist in the 
rebuilding, and find other „legal means‟.170 The Commission stressed the importance of 
Government for the success of the reparation program, and is responsible of financing the 
measures prescribed in their recommendations.
171
  
The SFWV was not established 3 months after the handover of the TRC report. 
Through bilateral and multilateral cooperation, there was effort by the Government in 
assisting some of the victims, yet this assistance was not carried out within the context of 
reparations.
172
 On 5 December 2009, six years after the TRC recommendations, the SFWV 
was launched by President Ernest Koroma in Freetown.
173
 NaCSA set up the fund, and it 
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will serve as a basket fund to receive contributions from Sierra Leoneans and friends of SL 
“to serve the welfare of the war victims.”174 The SFWV was not operational at the end of 
the Year-One Project.
175
 Many of the recommendations and proposed reparations for 
victims require long-term commitment. Relying heavily upon donor cooperation is 
unlikely to be sufficient for the magnitude of the project.  
One of the TRC recommendations was to use revenues generated from mineral 
sources, described in Chapter 2, however the NaCSA Commissioner says this is extremely 
difficult due to the nature of the mineral extraction industry. The Government itself does 
not mine, and there are not many companies in SL that engage in deep mining since it is a 
huge investment. Therefore revenues are minimal.
176
 The Finance Minister, Samura 
Kamara, also agrees by stating that “falling diamond prices, decreasing remittances and 
imports, and drug trafficking”177 leave SL facing huge socio-economic challenges. An 
estimated 60% unemployment rate
178
 also reduces the chances of obtaining funding from a 
potential reparation tax. The only solution is Government allocating funds to SFWV via its 
national budget, or asks for international assistance to fulfill its obligations stipulated in the 
Lome Peace Agreement. This is where PBF played a vital role.  
 
4.4.2 PBF 
 
PBF became a major donor to SLRP providing the majority of the seed money to 
“catalyze the process of resource mobilization from donors for subsequent years.”179 In 
December 2008, PBF transferred US$ 3million
180
 to its recipient organization
181
, the IOM, 
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towards building the capacity of NaCSA into a Year-One project “to design and manage a 
holistic reparations program that will promote healing, peace and reconciliation.”182 In 
comparison, Government funding towards supporting implementation of the SLRP as part 
of the recommendations of the TRC was US$ 246,000.
183
 This type of funding usually 
implies a 7% administration fee for the recipient organization (IOM), and administration 
and operation costs ranging around 15-20% for the  implementing agency/service 
providers (NaCSA). Meaning 75% of funding will go to beneficiaries.
184
 This was decided 
in the project design phase
185
 for Year-One.
186
 These conditions also apply for SLRP. This 
was to ensure that the majority of funding goes to victims.
187
 This reinforces the 
perspective that SLRP is a development project. The condition of funding being “used 
within one year, and 75% of the amount had to be spent in direct benefits to victims”188, 
implies there is little government/victim control over funding conditions.  
In addition, the main responsibility for funding reparations resides with Government, 
and as of December 2009, the PBF has made no mention of providing further funding 
assistance. There are several challenges to these conditionalities as will be discussed in 
following sections regarding the actual implementation of the SLRP.  
 
4.5 Institutional organization of Sierra Leones Reparation Program 
 
Due to the funding from PBF the SLRP became an international donor funded 
project. The PBF, IOM, and NaCSA were the main stakeholders and will be described in 
the following sections.    
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4.5.1 PBF as monitoring body 
 
In conjunction with the Year-One project grant of US$ 3million, PBF has been 
monitoring the SLRP process and activity. On a daily basis this monitoring is the 
responsibility of NaCSA and IOM, with input from UNIOSIL.
189
 The local PBF secretariat 
assists in providing monthly and quarterly monitoring.
190
 Evaluations of the project will be 
midterm and post project, and will focus on “indicating immediate effects of the 
intervention on the lives of the targeted benefits.”191 By monitoring the Year-One, PBF is 
essentially ensuring donors that the grant is used for its objective. The PBF does not create 
funding conditionalities, yet funds can only be directed to a UN organization. In this case 
the IOM.  
 
4.5.2 IOM as recipient body 
 
The PBF relies on the analytical, programming and implementation capacities of the 
UN departments, Funds, Programs and Specialized Agencies to deliver peacebuilding 
results within their mandates.
192
  
 
IOM is the recipient organization of the $3million dollar grant from the PBF. In 
conjunction with providing the grant, IOM also provides technical assistance and expertise 
to the SLRP
193
 in order for NaCSA to reach project outputs. IOM was also essential in 
providing assistance in the verification process of victims. NaCSA staff were recruited and 
trained in the use of the verification framework developed with IOM.
194
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4.5.3 NaCSA as service providers 
 
As seen in section 4.3, SLRP is a sub-unit of NaCSA, therefore NaCSA is 
delegated the full responsibility of structuring and providing reparations to the victims. 
This includes focusing on the “rehabilitation of victims through the delivery of social 
service packages and symbolic measures which acknowledge the past, the harm done to 
victims, and empower them to rebuild their lives.”195 The 4 main objectives of the SLRP 
are to: 
1. To respond to the needs of victims; 
2. To promote healing and reconciliation; 
3. To restore the dignity of the victims; 
4. To restore civic trust.196 
 
Addressing the recommendations of the TRC, the SLRP will include benefits for the most 
vulnerable victims in the following areas: health care, education, skills training and micro-
credits, pensions, micro-grants, fistula surgery, psychosocial support, housing, community 
and symbolic reparations.
197
 However, these benefits are conditional to fundraising 
abilities of the program. So far, certain victims groups will therefore, under Year-One, 
benefit only from certain reparations.
198
 
 
4.5.4 The Year-One Project 
 
The Year-One Project was initiated by Government to build a reparations unit at 
NaCSA to fulfill the TRC recommendations of creating a reparation program, and legal 
obligations in the Lome Peace Agreement to establish a SFWV.
199
 With PBF and 
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Government funding, the Year-One Project was “designed as a catalyst to kick-start critical 
interventions.”200 The Year-One Project aimed to provide the foundations for an 
institutional structure and framework that would facilitate the implementation of 
reparations, setting specific staffing, logistical and measurable organizational targets 
within NaCSA. NaCSA was also required to develop a five-year strategic plan for 
continued support for reparations.
201
 A set of additional outputs were: 
1. A database on profile of war victims established. 
2. Government, Victims, Civil Society, donors and other stakeholders sensitized on the 
reparations program. 
3. Special Fund for War Victims established and operationalized. 
4. Reparations sub-projects for War Victims implemented.202  
 
Output 4 included: 
1. Educational support to children that were amputees, war wounded, victims of sexual 
violence, and abducted, conscripted, born out of rape or orphaned. (excluding those 
benefited by the DDR program) 
2. Free fistula surgery and HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted infections (STI) testing 
and treatment for those women raped according to their need 
3. Free health care for all direct victims (excluding children of victims and war widows) 
4. Counseling and psychosocial support for all categories of victims.203 
 
According to the final project document the results were fully achieved. According to 
ICTJ‟s report the results of output 4 were somewhat varying.  
ICTJ reasoned that educational support was to reimburse educational expenses. 
Due to the long time period passed since conflict, many of the target beneficiaries would 
have aged out of the program. Therefore skills-training, as stipulated in the TRC report, 
would have been more appropriate. Yet, according to the Director of Reparations there are 
6,984 children benefitting from this educational grant of $100.
204
  
5 victims of sexual violence received fistula surgeries, and 235 were screened and 
provided with financial assistance to treat various types of STIs. 49 victims with critical 
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medical conditions underwent operations in Freetown.
205
 However, it seems extremely 
unlikely that the number of victims benefitting from health care is reflective of what is 
needed. This is supported by the Director stating: “as information of free treatment 
disperses late registration candidates have come forward requesting treatment.”206 Even 
though free physical health care was also in the five-year strategic plan, the Director and 
ICTJ agree that without sufficient funding it seems unlikely that the Ministry of Health will 
commit to this provision.
207
 Hospitals are already overburdened and underpaid, and would 
be hesitant to provide free health care without compensation.
208
 Community and 
psychosocial support activities were completed in four communities within Year-One.
209
 
Using the term „completed‟ in the annual report in regards of psychosocial support 
activities seems implausible considering the nature of these traumas.  
To summarize, in practice measures have been mostly directed to the payment of 
micro-grants. As of December 2009, 13,123 beneficiaries received a $100 micro-grant.
210
 
Beneficiaries included amputees, war wounded victims that have 50% or more incapacity, 
and victims of sexual violence.
211
 The payment period of the educational and micro-grants 
lasted from September 22 to October 16, 2009.
212
 The Director states that micro-grants are 
provided to comply with the condition of 75% of funds to be directed towards victims.
213
 
However ICTJ believes the intention was that NaCSA wanted to “create a kind of relief to 
victims”214. This is also reiterated in the annual report stating: “micro grants, education 
support and medical assistance helped in concretely acknowledging and addressing human 
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right abuses suffered by victims during the war.”215 Though, interim payments were not 
mentioned in TRC recommendations, which recommended pensions and social services. 
As one can see from the aims of the Year-One Project, most if not all targets requires long 
term implementation, and as we will see in the following section this will be the greatest 
challenge. 
   
4.5.5 Implementation of a long-term reparation program  
 
There are serious concerns that SLRP will not continue beyond Year-One due to 
severe funding shortages. “In 2010, SLRP needs a projected budget of US$ 8million to 
start sustaining the achievements of 2009.”216 This is almost triple the amount of funding 
received in 2009.  As of November 2009, no other funds have been secured.
217
  The PBF 
grant was “not intended to supplant national ownership of a peace process,”218 and 
encourages the Government to find other means to sustain the reparations program. 
NaCSA‟s Reparations Program Manager, Amadu Bangura, said they “planned to continue 
assistance in 2010 but were short of funds for the reparations program.”219 Even though 
20,000 victim beneficiaries received educational or micro-grants by the end of 2009, there 
is serious concern from Cristian Correa, senior associate at the ICTJ that “the government 
might see this as having filled its duty of complying with obligations to victims.”220 Unless 
funds are raised beyond Year-One, many beneficiaries would receive no redress, and this 
in turn would reinforce their sense of injustice. Continued political will, and assistance will 
be essential for the Government to fulfill its obligations towards redress.  However, within 
Year-One they have established a victim database, and started providing reparation. The 
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next sections present how the victim database was established, and the amputee victim 
group will illustrate the impact of reparation received.  
 
4.6 Establishing a victim database 
 
Establishing a victim database requires the registration of all potential victims 
falling under the category of „most vulnerable‟ listed in section 4.1. War widows were 
registered, however were considered as an additional class of victims.
221
 Providing pension 
to war widows was considered extremely costly due to the amount of victims, and will 
therefore be provided by SLRP at a later stage.
222
 As of December 31
st
, NaCSA established 
a database of 29,733 victims exceeding the 19,000 anticipated.
223
 The registration of 
victims started in December 2008, and was scheduled to end on March 31
st
, 2009. 
However, this period was insufficient, since by March 2009 only 14,017 victims registered. 
Therefore registration was extended until June 30
th
 2009, with a provision providing late 
registration.
224
 This was essential for the female victim group, which are heavily 
stigmatized due to their traumas. Due to tight time constraints, screening and verification 
processes there was concern that potential beneficiaries were excluded from the 
database.
225
 In addition, rural areas which were heavily affected by the war, show low 
levels of registration and potential beneficiaries may not have been registered. 
Registration was performed by NaCSA officials trained by IOM. Information on 
registration was broadcasted on radio, TV and newspapers in all local languages.
226
 
Registration locations were strategically placed in all major cities, and registration teams 
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went to rural locations to find victims.
227
 In order to register for reparation, a photo is taken 
of the alleged victim and their family members, and they must give an oral testimony about 
what happened to them.
228
 An applicant also has to show identification or paperwork 
proving he/she was wounded in the war. Amputees have formed AWWA. All members 
have ID cards making verification easier. However, NaCSA has provided little information 
on details concerning the registration process. Although, the NaCSA Commissioner has 
stated that “we have an obligation to protect their identity and the information they provide 
to us.”229 However, even though the interview may have taken place in a private setting the 
verification process could have revealed victim identities.  
Verification of victims required intensive research, because there are no conclusive 
statistics to work from. Verification required recommendations from medical 
professionals, local civil society groups, local religious leaders and women‟s groups to 
verify the accuracy of statements.
230
  It is unclear if they were under confidentiality 
agreements, yet in order to verify they would have had to confer with others. False 
accounts pose a threat here. Recommendations might not have been handed to actual 
victims, and fears of further stigmatization could play a large role in reducing the 
likelihood to claim victimhood, especially in regards to victims of sexual abuse. Also, it is 
extremely difficult to verify accounts of sexual violence several years after the incident. 
NaCSA has to trust victim statements in this victim category.
231
  
Victim registration was 10,000+ victims over the expected. This implies that the 
Government did not have proficient insight into the extent of victims in its country. 
Exceeding the expected could signify that registration had great outreach success. Since 
the starting data was weak, there could also be more unidentified victims. However, 
stigmatization plays a large role in SL society and could affect potential victim candidates 
registering. Weak starting data could also increase the potential of fraudulent activities.  
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The annual project document states that the registration was fully completed
232
, and 
SLRP is now closed for registration.
233
 It has been noted by SLRP that there are still late 
registration candidates. Coping with unregistered victims without abusing the system is a 
big operational challenge.
234
 Therefore fully completing registration and verification as a 
goal of Year-One was extremely unrealistic.     
 
4.7 Amputee beneficiaries 
 
The TRC states that “most Sierra Leoneans agree that amputees, war wounded, 
women who suffered sexual abuse, children and war widows would constitute special 
categories of victims who are in dire need of urgent care.”235 The Commission considered 
the fact that many of them who fall into the different categories are “enduring physical 
handicaps as a result of which they suffered cumulative harm both physically and 
mentally.”236 Many are unable to “reintegrate into their communities of origin, cannot 
sustain themselves of their families, and are unable to tend to their medical conditions 
because of the high costs associated with treatment.”237 The TRC recommended  that 
reparation should seek to address the victim‟s current needs, even if only putting them on 
an equal footing with the larger category of victims. “The reparations program aims at 
contributing to the rehabilitation of those victims, even if complete rehabilitation is not 
possible.”238 From these TRC recommendations, the SLRP took its starting point. As of 
December 2009, victims have not had their needs adequately met according to these TRC 
principles. In Year-One outputs (section 4.5.4), we see various approaches taken to address 
the specific needs of each category of victim. However, outputs have been extremely 
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limited to funding. This section will look at the specificity of reparations to amputees, an 
easily identifiable and organized group with specific needs due to their disabilities.   
Out of the 29,733 registered victims in NaCSA‟s database, 1,285 were registered as 
amputees.
239
 This surprisingly low number can be attributed to several factors. Firstly this 
could be due to ICTJ‟s reason as being “explained quite simply by low number of actual 
victims of amputations.”240 During the conflict, media highlighted amputation in reports 
from the region, thus resulting in skewed perceptions of the amount of amputations. 
However, there is no official number of forcible amputations that took place, and it would 
be extremely difficult to calculate in hindsight. Secondly, it could be perceived that some 
amputees have not registered at all, although highly unlikely due to the fact that NGO‟s 
attempting to register amputees for aid estimated similar numbers to that of NaCSA. 
However, most notably Alhaji Lamin Jusu Jarka, the head of AWWA, believes that only 1 
out of 5 amputee victims managed to survive forcible amputation, and current numbers are 
dwindling due to extreme poverty, suicide and high risk of disease.
241
 Since SLRP did not 
start registration until late 2008
242
 and AWWA started in 2002
243
, with the conflict started 
on 23 March 1991
244
, it is very possible a number of amputees died before being able to 
register with either organization. However, focus will be on registered amputees with 
NaCSA as they will be the subject of benefits.  
 
4.7.1 Definition of amputee eligible for reparation  
 
The criterion for eligibility in the category of amputee is that the event or injury 
sustained must have occurred between 23
rd
 March 1991 and 1
st
 March 2002. Citizens as 
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well as non-citizens are granted equal access to reparations if they sustained injuries as a 
civilian during the time specified as a consequence of a violation committed against 
them.
245
  
Amputees according to SLRP are defined as “victims who lost their upper or lower 
limbs as a result of the conflict.”246 It is unclear if this definition includes persons whom 
were amputated due to other severe wounds attained during conflict. For example some 
one who was shot in the arm, brought to a medical facility and had to be amputated due to 
severe infection. However, if they did not qualify for amputation status they would fall 
under the category of war-wounded and would receive equal benefits if their injury 
resulted in a 50% or more reduction in earning capacity.
247
 The TRC recommendations 
include also a 50% or more reduction in earning capacity is also applicable for certain 
benefits for amputees.
248
 There is no data from the SLRP to verify if the same applies in 
their benefit scheme.  
There are various types of forcible amputations that have occurred during the 
conflict. Forcible hand amputations are the most notable with the war in SL. However legs, 
fingers, toes, ears, eyes, and genitalia were also subjected to forcible amputations.
249
 The 
TRC Commission “did not want to accord the same benefits to a victim who lost his/her 
limbs, with a victim who lost a finger as a result of a violation and may be able to sustain 
himself/herself.”250 Therefore the Commission recommends that the loss of an arm 
constitutes a 70%
251
 reduction in earning capacity.
252
 Below you can see the 
Commissions recommendations of other forms of disabilities framing earning capacity.  
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Fingers and Thumbs: 
60%: loss of four fingers and thumb of one hand; 
35%: loss of four fingers; and loss of one thumb 
10%: loss of index finger; 
6%: loss of middle finger; 
5%: loss of ring finger; and 
4%: loss of little finger. 
Toes:   15%: loss of toes. 
Eyes:   100%: total loss of sight; 
30%: removal of eye from socket; and 
30%: loss of sight. 
Ears: 50%: loss of both ears; and 
7%: loss of one ear 
253
 
Everything has a percentage. 50% can be the result of one injury, or an aggregate of 
injuries that total or exceed this benchmark.
254
 Since genitalia are not specified, this 
method creates much confusion, demonstrating a sense of arbitrariness. SLRP‟s definition 
of amputation as loss of upper or lower limbs exacerbates this weakness.
255
 However, the 
Directorate of Reparations are planning and soliciting funds for the expansion of benefits 
in subsequent years
256
, but as we saw from section 4.5.5 this is not guaranteed.   
 
4.8 Reparations for amputees  
 
TRC, from received testimonies, states that victims (in general) requested redress in 
the form of social services rather than individual cash payments.
257
 According to TRC the 
percentages of statement-makers seeking various types of assistance and redress were: 
Homes/Shelter: 49% 
Schools/Training/Education: 41% 
Hospitals/Medical Care: 27% 
Cash: 18% 
Infrastructure/Transport: 16% 
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Materials/Tools: 15% 
Loans/Micro-Credit: 10% 
Institutional Reform: 8% 
Justice/Trials: 2% 
Religious Rites: 1%  
258
 
 
Therefore TRC defends its recommendation of social service based reparation, believing 
that it is acting in the expressed desires of victims themselves.
259
 Reasoning that: “restoring 
the human dignity of a victim means helping him or her to become a fully participating 
citizen of society again.”260 Providing a steady income, home, education and medical care 
can contribute significantly to the feeling of recovered dignity. Empowering, training and 
repairing injustices can make them and their families economically independent from life-
long state support mechanisms.  
   
4.8.1 Basic reparations for amputees 
 
According to NaCSA‟s public information leaflet, amputees are to receive free 
physical healthcare; education; and housing for the most vulnerable within the Year-One 
Project.
261
 However, putting modalities in place to implement service delivery is time 
consuming. Thus, NaCSA devised a payment in Year-One to “create interim relief”.262 The 
payment was only eligible to principle applicants approved by NaCSA, which meant that 
no dependent of the victims would benefit, except indirectly through victims. Grants of 
US$100 were given to registered amputees that had an earning incapacity of 50% or 
more.
263
 In the next section, the extent of what a micro-grant of US$100 can accomplish in 
SL will be analyzed.  
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4.8.2 An effort to create relief? 
 
According to the annual report a grant of US$100 supports “an effort to respond to 
their needs, to restore their dignity and to create relief.
264
 This presumes that in SL relief 
can be provided by this amount. As of 2008, the World Banks threshold for extreme 
poverty is US$1.25 a day (purchasing power parity).
265
 Working from this assumption, this 
„relief‟ would last less than three months, at most, if one was to live on the threshold of the 
extreme poverty line. With 76.1% of Sierra Leoneans living on less than US$2 dollars a 
day
266
, and an unemployment rate at 60%
267
, amputees is a seriously disadvantaged victim 
group.  
Losing limbs or a limb equals a total or severe reduction in the ability to work. 
Lack of income means dependency. Either this dependency is on family or charitable 
gestures. Immediate relief is a vague term. Victims are in varying conditions. Some victims 
may have dependents to provide for, others are assisted by their families, and some may 
have no support networks at all. Their health is also in varying conditions. This may be due 
to the injuries they were subjected to, or the abysmal living conditions they may find 
themselves in. Therefore a blanket grant of US$100 would allow some victims to pursue 
possible small income generating activities, whereas others would have to prioritize their 
health. The lack of consideration towards external variables creates more inequality within 
this already disadvantaged victim group. Only victims can be the judge of what constitutes 
interim relief. Even so, US$100 is not sufficient to be an agent of change. Let alone be 
called a form of redress for amputee victims. 
To fully appreciate the need for reparations in SL, it is important to have an in-
depth knowledge of victim violations and needs. Victim voices provide a necessary 
perspective to holistically understand implications of reparation. 
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5 Victim Testimonies 
 
Victim reparation is not an abstract concept. This chapter will provide the reader with 
the  insight into the reasons why there is such a strong argument for reparations for the 
amputee victim group in SL, and to address their needs/wants as a group. There are few 
full victim testimonies published, and the details of the full extent of abuse are for the most 
part unknown. This chapter will give the voice back to victims. The testimonies in the 
following sections are from amputee victims whilst doing field research in SL 2009. 
Challenges for implementing the SLRP should be placed in perspective with regards to 
daily struggles of amputees. 
 
5.1 Selection criteria used for interview candidates 
 
100 amputee victim interviews were conducted for this field research. The only 
criterion to be included was that the person was registered in NaCSA‟s victim database. 
Location was not relevant for interviews, however precautions were taken to include a 
broad victim base. Various victim organizations, and non-governmental organizations 
provided information on areas in which clusters of amputees resided. It was practically 
feasible to schedule interviews when cooperating with other organizations. Yet, locations 
were not disclosed to other organizations. 4 different cities dispersed around SL were used 
as starting points. In total interviews were collected from 10 different locations throughout 
the country. Time in each location was restricted due travel expenditure, personal safety 
and the number of potential interview candidates in each location. Prior to the interview, a 
verbal invitation from the researcher was extended to potential candidates a day in 
advanced. The interviews took place all day allowing flexibility for victims to participate.  
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It was essential to protect the identity of all interview candidates to the extent 
possible in such circumstances. Specifics such as names, dates, location, and age will not 
be provided. The victim statements are recorded in Krio (English derived language) and 
were translated into English by the researcher. The statements appear as they were 
described. The reader should be warned that the statements include graphic details which 
may be disturbing.       
 
 
5.2 Victim statement: 1 
 
This victim obtained several injuries including multiple lacerations, amputation of 
genitalia, and force fed his own ear. Before the incident, he was a rice farmer with a 
sustainable income. He is currently unemployed, and lacks financial assistance to return to 
farming. His wife left him shortly after he obtained these injuries.  
  
My family and I were at an old farmhouse getting ready for working in the 
rice field. I walk out to work, leaving my family with all the stored rice. I 
start working. Suddenly I hear a noise. Surrounding me is a group of rebels. I 
did not hear them before. I think they have not seen me. I try to think of 
where I could go, but just start running.  
 
I didn‟t know that I was circled by rebels that where only small boys. They 
saw me. I try to run but one grabs me by the trousers. And they throw me to 
the ground. They start beating me with a machete. Shouting at me to show 
the location of my rice storage. I refuse, knowing my family is there.  
 
They strip me naked. I show them the rice I collected today. They wanted to 
know where all the rice was stored. I still refuse. They take their machetes 
and they chop off my left ear. “This is only the beginning.” Then shoving my 
ear into my mouth.  
 
“Eat.” I refused. They held me down harder. Force feeding me my own ear. I 
spit my ear out of my mouth.  
 
They then hit me with the back of a gun straight into my chest. They tie my 
arms behind my back. Telling me that they were going to cut off my penis. I 
 63 
pleaded. Begging them no. Please. No. For the sake of God please do not 
chop off my penis. 
 
“We are your God.”  I still refuse to show them the location of the rice, 
fearing for my family. 
 
“We will kill you.” They point a gun in my neck. Another rebel starts slicing 
my back. Moving slowly up towards my neck. With the tip of a machete. 
They cut so deep. They cut straight to my esophagus. I try to struggle. 
 
They move down to my lower body. They cut my penis off.  
 
When they finished with me. They said, “This man will not survive when we 
are finished with him. He will die. Let‟s go.” But they stand there. Watching 
me. I just lay there. Watching back at them. They make a decision. If I try to 
stand up they will shoot me. I make no attempt to move. They eventually 
leave.  
 
I am so hungry. I start eating the sand beside me. I defecate. I fall into 
unconsciousness.  
 
The next thing I know is someone tapping me. “Chief wake up. Wake up.” 
 
I somehow manage to stand up. But no one is there. I am afraid, and start 
running. I  try to find my wife and daughter. I see the farmhouse. But I can 
see it has been attacked. All the rice was gone. I don‟t know if my family is 
alive. I start running. But  I fall into the swamp. I am so hungry. I start eating 
mud from the swamp.  
 
I do not know where I am. But I keep running. By now,  the rebels had 
noticed I was gone and seen my trail of blood. They start tracking me. I have 
lost a lot of blood. I hear them talking somewhere behind me. But I can no 
longer walk. I grab at branches to try standing. I can lose nothing, they are 
too close.   
I find a river, and fall in. The river goes red. My blood. I go down the river. I 
hear them searching. They no longer have my blood trail. I crawl up, and 
out. I hide. I still hear them talking.  
 
“This man is around this area. Find him.” But they cannot find my blood 
trail. The river has deceived them.  
 
I see the village, and more rebels. I then hear a familiar voice. The rebels 
have caught my brother‟s wife. She was nine months pregnant. I hear the 
rebels arguing if the baby was a boy. I hear them cut her open. They 
removed the baby from her stomach. So many people are screaming. I 
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cannot go into the village. I will die in the bush. I lay and just listen to 
people crying in the village.  
 
I was lying naked. All of a sudden a man came. I beg him to get clothes for 
me. Something to wrap around my waste. The man just left. Murder is taking 
place in the town. The rebels start burning everything to the ground. I start 
crawling towards the main road. People saw me, but ran away thinking that I 
was a rebel.  
 
“Please don‟t run away from me. Please give me something to lie down on.  
A mat or anything.” Someone eventually came with a mat.  
 
“Please ask for my family. I will give you their names. If you know them 
please get them to help me.” I just lay on the mat. From dawn until day 
break.  
 
In the morning my family found me. I was so swollen. I could not be carried. 
Everything hurt. Every time they touched me I screamed. I lay in the bush, 
because the rebels were still around. My whole body was cut.  
 
I lay there for 7 days. 
 
I told my family to go. I will die. I want to die. 
 
The birds (vultures) start eating me. I want to die. I cannot. It is six miles to 
the nearest big city. So I just lay there trying to move, but small small.  
 
My family told others to come bury me, but if I am still alive bring me to the 
city.   
 
I saw my brother. My brother did not recognize me. I was so swollen. He 
thought I was a rebel.  
 
“Please don‟t fear me. I am your brother. I want to die. But I cannot. Please 
take me away from here.” 
 
They find sticks and wrap them with fishing nets. They carry me on their 
shoulders, all the way to the city.  
 
I was so hungry. I had not eaten. My brother buys rice. But I can‟t swallow. 
They had cut too deep. I suck the rice. I cannot eat.  
 
My family found Doctors Without Borders. They tell them where I am. The 
doctors take me to hospital. I am an emergency case. They must take me 
Freetown. They performed surgery. Put me to sleep. I take treatment, but I 
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am still in pain. They take me to an amputee camp. Keep treating my penis 
until it healed. It is not perfectly healed. They tell me to go home to get 
treated. I still have the pain. But when it is bad I go to the doctor. But it 
costs. I am much better now. I received a house from an aid organization, 
because I could not pay rent. Now I have a small farm. But I have no money. 
 
My wife left me when I was in hospital. She wouldn‟t stay with me. My 
daughter stays with my sister in Freetown. But my nephews stay here to help 
me.  (SIC)    
 
5.3 Victim statement: 2 
 
This female was subjected to double arm amputation. Due to old age, she is 
dependent on family and charitable gestures to survive. She is a mother, but needs help to 
dress, bathe, and feed herself.  
  
I heard the rebels.  
 
I was at home. It was midday. They came so fast. My family and I tried to 
hide in our house. But they threw fire through the window. We ran out. They 
had surrounded us. Just small boys. So many of them. 
 
They gathered us. And grabbed me.  
 
I was first. 
 
They pull me down to a tree stub. Stretch my arms out.  
 
“Short sleeves or long sleeves?”  
 
I scream. I plead. 
 
“We will chop your arms in the middle.”  
 
They use a machete. And chop right below my elbow. But they are not strong 
enough. They cannot get a clean chop. They call out to the next. I lay there 
screaming.  
 
Everything is unclear. I start walking to town, with my arms dangling by the 
skin.  
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It takes many hours. Too long. When I reach a doctor, they say they cannot 
save my arms.  
 
The rebels killed ten, and amputated five. I will never go back there. They 
burnt everything down. There is nothing there anymore. (SIC) 
 
 
5.4 Victim statement: 3 
 
This victim was subjected to forcible amputation of his arm. Prior to the incident, he 
had his own general store and car. Now, he begs on the street for money to feed his wife 
and 3 children.  
 
I owned a shop were I sold goods. Every month I would drive many hours to 
Freetown to buy all the stock for the shop. I was good at bargaining. It 
happened when I was on one of these trips to Freetown. When I bought the 
goods I started driving back on the highway. I got half-way.  
 
I saw the rebels too late. I could not turn around or they would shoot. They 
pointed a gun in my face. Told me to get out of the car. They took 
everything. My car, and everything in it. Then they took the little money I 
had on me. I was left with nothing. They took me to where there were others.  
 
“Short sleeves or long sleeves?” I started screaming. Pleading. “No.” 
 
They showed no mercy. They cut my left arm. Leaving me to die by the 
road. Driving away in my car. I knew I would die. I wrapped some clothes 
around my arm. Screaming. I walked all the way back to Freetown for help. 
(SIC) 
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5.5 Victim group analysis 
 
“I can‟t be struggling and say I live in peace.”-Amputee 
Amputee victims are extremely vulnerable members of SL society. Previously, 
functional members of their communities, now left to beg on the streets, relying on 
goodwill to sustain themselves. Since amputation was carried out at random there is 
no specific background for this victim group. However, the vast majority lack basic 
education and skills-training.  
There are amputee housing communities, in which clusters of amputees live 
dispersed throughout SL. When asked if they would return to original communities, a 
common response is that there is nothing there for them. Many also emphasized that 
common victimhood brings value to their lives. Due to their disabilities, they often 
feel inhuman, disregarded and shunned.   
Half of those interviewed were unemployed. Due to the nature of their injuries, 
many are unable to do basic daily tasks remaining dependent on others. Those victims 
who have an income, are not earning enough to sustain themselves, continuing to live 
in abject poverty.  
With 60% unemployment in SL, these individuals are competing for work 
alongside many highly skilled and physically able persons. Often they are disregarded 
as „unable‟, reinforcing social stereotypes of being „undesirable‟. Realistically, work is 
dependent on ones physical and mental capabilities. Work requires education and/or 
skills training, lacking this, there are few possibilities for these individuals to become 
self-sufficient.  
In victims own perspectives, they would like to be provided with micro-grants to 
pursue capital ventures. Equipment such as tractors, sewing machines, and over all 
seed money to start a business was the most common request. Free secondary 
education for themselves and dependents was also another priority. However, the main 
threat to amputees beside abject poverty, is their varying health conditions. 
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 SL is a high risk zone for infectious diseases. According the World Health 
Organization in SL the life expectancy for males is 37 years, while for females it is 40 
years. The primary causes of death are lower respiratory infections, diarroheal disease, 
perinatal conditions, malaria, HIV/AIDs, measles and tuberculosis.
268
 Amputees (like 
the rest of the population) are susceptible to these other life threatening diseases. 
However, unlike the rest of the population, almost all suffer chronic pain from 
prolonged incidences of torture and mutilation. Prolonged physical labour means that 
they are aggravating old injuries or contracting new injuries. In this small sample 
group there were five incidences of untreated severe hernias. Due to their incapability 
to work, or low income, they are unable to pay for health treatment, exacerbating their 
conditions. Free healthcare should be of primary concern for the SLRP.  
 When asked in the time period June-August 2009, victims were unaware of what 
reparations they would receive from SLRP. Every interviewee had registered, but was 
unaware of when or if they would ever receive reparation. All interviewees had heard 
of the rehabilitation packages for ex-combatants, and mentioned this as unfair 
treatment.  
 If SLRP meets the requirements of the Basic Principles (section 3.3 and 3.4) will be 
assessed in the following chapter.  
                                                 
268
 WHO (2006)  
 69 
6 Assessing SLRP         
 
“Adequate, effective and prompt”269 shapes the Basic Principles requirements for 
reparation. In order to see whether SLRP has managed to fulfill these criteria there has 
been a review of SLRP and the situation of victims.  
Adequacy requires „proportional‟ and „restorative‟ impact of reparations. Within its 
first year of application, SLRP has managed to „complete‟ registration and successfully 
provide educational and micro-grants. However, section 4.8.2 demonstrates US$100 does 
not create relief even in the short run. Managing victim needs and expectations is a huge 
challenge to the SLRP as US$100 was insufficient. As we saw in the previous section, the 
amputees are in an extremely vulnerable position, and in dire need of sustainable support. 
The SLRP has a five year strategy with extensive benefits, however severe funding 
shortage puts this program in jeopardy.   
Effective reparation is dependent on the structure, abilities and resources of the 
reparation program. This is directly correlated to Government commitment to reparations. 
Not only verbal commitment, but by concretely rearranging budget and policy priorities. 
Building a strong foundation for SLRP to meet SL requirements within Year-One was 
accomplished due to solely to PBF funding. However, no secure funding for 2010 implies 
no follow up reparations, impairing SLRP‟s long term ability to provide reparation.  
The absence of a „right to reparation‟ exacerbates inefficiency, as placing SLRP 
under a social fund enhances perceptions that SL‟s reparation could be considered a 
development project. Sustainability of SLRP then becomes extremely vulnerable to 
funding, and conditionalities. Since one of the main objectives of the SLRP is to “restore 
the dignity of victims”270, and there seems to be no other means to seek address, victims 
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are left as beneficiaries of a charitable endeavor. This structure indirectly disempowers 
victims in lieu of restoring dignity. 
As of 2010, it has been six years since the publication of TRC recommendations. 
Although IOM believes there might be some criticism over late implementation, they argue 
that the processes required to institutionalize reparations were quick considering the 
complex institutional dialogue and process needed.
271
 However, section 4.3 demonstrates 
that there were unnecessary political delays in creating the institutional structures for 
SLRP.  NaCSA blames delays in funding.
272
 6 years of delays can insinuate a lot of things. 
Neglect and a lack of commitment by the Government in fulfilling its obligation to provide 
redress can have many negative effects in a country emerging from a brutal civil war. 
Politically this could have implications for the maintenance of peace itself. Victims that 
have experienced grave human rights violations may not cooperate or respect authority if 
they held a strong sense of injustice or mistrust towards the Government. Arguably, 
reparations could and should have been implemented earlier.  
It is important to remember that even though it is questionable if SL is fulfilling 
Basic Principles criteria, victims were and still live in abysmal conditions waiting for 
adequate reparations.  
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7  Conclusion 
 
Limited access to data, which when found is often skewed, vague and conflicting, 
normally affect studies concerning SL. This thesis overcomes these limitations as data and 
viewpoints have been gathered, verified and cross referenced from all involved and 
affected actors. Therefore this thesis presents an unprecedented balanced, yet informative 
discussion and assessment of SLRP‟s specific reparation policies and structure. Through 
presenting perceptions of reparations from international law and experts, engaged actors, 
but most importantly emphasizing the potential impact on the persons reparations aim to 
empower, this thesis creates a holistic appreciation of the complex structure and processes 
required to construct a reparation program post-conflict.  
The future of SLRP beyond Year-One is questionable. Even though SL has 
accepted the right for the most vulnerable victims of SL‟s brutal civil war to receive 
reparation, it has been unable to create a self-sustainable reparation program. This is 
mostly due to lack of funding (international and domestic), the legal and institutional 
structure of SLRP, and delays in concrete political action. Due to these setbacks, victims 
are left without adequate, efficient, and prompt reparation. The implications being that the 
most vulnerable victims remain deprived of their right to lead a life in dignity, which was 
one of the main objectives of the SLRP. 
In order to legitimize human rights law there needs to be adequate practical 
implementation of its provisions. When a person has had his or her rights violated, they 
have a right to redress. This is the basis of a functioning domestic and international legal 
system. For societies where there are weak structural enforcement mechanisms this is 
extremely difficult. Even so, post-conflict SL has taken upon itself the obligation to 
provide redress. Accepting international standards of human rights, but also reinforcement 
of these standards through national policy is essential for upholding accountability. To 
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achieve this, SL needs to change institutional structures to ensure victims that they have a 
right to redress, and can in no way be perceived as a development project‟s charitable 
object.  
Currently, victim beneficiaries are dependent on the political will and abilities of 
Government. The SL Government was unable or unwilling to protect its citizens from 
these violations when they occurred. Therefore in order to re-establish trust in governance, 
SL has to be accountable to its victims. Since the most vulnerable victims continue to live 
in abject poverty, lack adequate health care and education, the SL Government has a great 
need to fulfill its international, but most importantly self imposed obligations to provide 
reparation.  
The implications of studying SLRP is that fellow researchers, practitioners, and 
others interested are able to have an insight into the practical application of the concept of 
reparation in SL. In addition, as more information and research is gathered on this topic a 
more meaningful discussion regarding reparation in SL will emerge. However, this thesis 
also provides a practical example for others concerned with the intricacies involved with 
providing reparation in other post-conflict settings. External as much as internal factors 
play a large role in affecting an outcome desirable to international standards. Even though 
providing reparations in post-conflict settings is difficult it should be remembered that 
reparations are not just an ideal, they are necessary for assisting and sustaining victim 
rights. If a country as disadvantaged structurally and economically as SL can make 
meaningful and concrete steps to providing reparations, it should be an example to others.   
By reading this thesis, donors and potential donors have the possibility of having an 
unbiased look at the accomplishments and challenges facing the SLRP. Also, this thesis 
provides insight into unforeseen yet manageable challenges, giving donors the ability to 
fully understand and change their impact in order to create a sustainable reparation 
program. Therefore international cooperation is called upon to assist SL in meeting its 
legal obligations as reparations are an integral part of its transition to peace. Reparations, 
amongst other things, re-establish trust in government, but most importantly allow victims 
to become fully participating members of society again.      
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SL has to demonstrate genuine interest in implementing reparation by finding 
sustainable funding to secure the future of SLRP, whether these are domestic or 
international sources, in order to create a credible reparations program. Only when victims‟ 
needs are properly addressed, can SL move forwards from its brutal civil war and call itself 
accountable to its citizens. It should be noted that SL has in fact taken meaningful steps to 
actualizing reparation for its victims. However, as we have seen throughout the thesis, 
good intentions have limitations.  
 74 
 
 75 
Bibliography 
 
Part I - Law 
 
International Conventions and Resolutions 
 
Basic Principles Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human 
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law; adopted by General Assembly Resolution 60/147 of 16 
December 2005. http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/remedy.htm 
[cited: 23 March 2010] 
 
CAT Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/39/15 
(1984); (Adopted by the General Assembly on 10 December 1984.) 
 
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Adopted and 
opened for signature, ratification and accession by General 
Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966).  
 
ICCPR GC 31  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights General 
Comment No.31 [80] Nature of the General Legal Obligation 
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant: 26/05/2004. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13. 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/58f5d4646e861359c1256ff6005
33f5f?Opendocument [cited: 23 March 2010] 
 76 
 
ICERD International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969.) 
 
 
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (Adopted and opened for 
signature, ratification and accession by the General Assembly 
resolution 213 (III), 10 December 1948). 
 
National Law 
 
Constitution The Constitution of Sierra Leone. Freetown 1991. http://www.sierra-
leone.org/Laws/constitution1991.pdf [cited: 23 March 2010] 
 
Lome Peace Agreement  Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone 
and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone 
(RUF/SL). Signed in Lome on 18 May 1999. 
http://www.sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html [cited: 23 
March 2010] 
 
TRC Act The Truth and Reconciliation Act. Freetown 2000. 
http://www.sierra-leone.org/Laws/2000-4.pdf [cited: 23 March 
2010] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 77 
 
PART II – Project Documents, Reports, and Studies 
 
Project Documents 
 
[SL-PBF]. Support to the Implementations of the Reparations Programme as part of the 
Recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Project Document. 
NY: United Nations Peace Building Fund, 2008. (Project Title: PBF/SLE/A-4 IMPL OF 
THE REPARA; Project ID: 00066685; Project Document Number: PBF-SLE-A-4 ProDoc 
– Support to NaCSA.doc) 
http://mdtf.undp.org/dashboard/project/documents?dash=00066685 [cited: 03/22/2010] 
 
[SL-PBF]. Support to the Implementations of the Reparations Programme as part of the 
Recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Project Status 
Report. NY: United Nations Peace Building Fund, December 2009. (Project Title: 
PBF/SLE/A-4 IMPL OF THE REPARA; Project ID: 00066685; Project Document 
Number: PBF-SLE-A-4-Q409.doc) 
http://mdtf.undp.org/dashboard/project/documents?dash=00066685 [cited: 03/22/2010] 
 
[SL-PBF]. Support to the Implementations of the Reparations Programme as part of the 
Recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Project Progress 
Line. NY: United Nations Peace Building Fund, 2008-2009. (Project Title: PBF/SLE/A-4 
IMPL OF THE REPARA; Project ID: 00066685) 
http://mdtf.undp.org/dashboard/project/timeline?dash=00066685 [cited: 03/22/2010]   
 
[SL-PBF Annual Report]. United Nations Peacebuilding Fund Annual Project Narrative 
Progress Report: Reporting Period: 1 January-31 December 2009. NY: United Nations 
Peace Building Fund, 2009. (Project Title: PBF/SLE/A-4 IMPL OF THE REPARA; 
Project ID: 00066685) http://mdtf.undp.org/dashboard/project/documents?dash=00066685 
[cited: 08/04/2010] 
 78 
 
United Nations Peace Building Fund (PBF). Guidelines for Applying to the United Nations 
Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). NY: 2009. www.unpbf.org/docs/application_guidelines.pdf 
[cited: 31/03/2010]  
 
Reports 
 
Truth & Reconciliation Commission, Sierra Leone. Witness to Truth: Report of the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission Vol.2. Ghana, Graphic Packaging Ltd., 2004. 
http://www.sierra-leone.org/TRCDocuments.html [cited: 04/06/2010] 
 
REDRESS. Implementation of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC) Recommendations on Reparations: Preliminary Options Report. London: The 
REDRESS Trust., 2007. http://www.redress.org/cms.php?page=75 [cited: 03/22/2010] 
 
Suma, Mohamad and Cristian Correa. Report and Proposals for the Implementation of 
Reparations in Sierra Leone. International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ): NY 
2009. 
http://www.ictj.org/static/Africa/SierraLeone/ICTJ_SL_ReparationsRpt_Dec2009.pdf 
[cited: 15/02/2010]. 
 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Human Development Report 2009-
Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development. NY 2009. 
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/103.html [cited: 2/04/2010] 
 
 
Studies 
 
[National Long Term Perspective Studies, Sierra Leone?] Sierra Leone Vision 2025: 
“Sweet-Salone”, Strategies for National Transformation. Freetown, Sierra Leone, 2004. 
 79 
 
Commission on Human Rights: Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities. Study concerning the right to restitution, compensation and 
rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Final report submitted by Mr. Theo van Boven, Special Rapporteur. 2 July 1993 
(E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8) 
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/e1b5e2c6a294f7bec1256a5b003
61173?Opendocument [cited: 6/04/2010]. 
 
 
PART III – Books, Chapters and Articles  
 
Books 
 
Falk, Richard. Reparations, International Law, and Global Justice: A New Frontier. In: 
The Handbook of Reparations. Ed. by Pablo de Greiff. New York 2006, p.478-503. 
 
Ferstman, Carla; Goetz, Mariana and Alan Stephens. Introduction. In: Reparations for 
Victims of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: Systems in Place and 
Systems in the Making. Ed. by Carla Ferstman, Mariana Goetz and Alan Stephens. Leiden 
2009, p.7-15. 
 
Fieldwork under Fire: Contemporary Studies of Violence and Survival. Edited by Carolyn 
Nordstrom and Antonius C. G. M. Robben. London, (University of California Press), 1995. 
 
De Greiff, Pablo. Justice and Reparations. In: The Handbook of Reparations. Ed. by Pablo 
de Greiff. New York 2006, p.451-477. 
 
Freeman, Michael. Back to the Future: The Historical Dimension of Liberal Justice. In: 
Repairing the Past. Ed. By Max du Plessis and Stephen Pete. Antwerp 2007, p.29-51. 
 80 
 
Garcia-Godos, Jemima. Victim Reparations in Transitional Justice-What is at Stake and 
Why. In: Nordic Journal of Human Rights. Vol. 26 (2008), p.111-147. 
 
Gillard, Emanuela-Chiara. Reparation for Violations of International Humanitarian Law. 
In: International Review of the Red Cross. No.851 (2003), p.529-554.  
 
Hamber, Brandon. Narrowing the Micro and Macro: A psychological Perspective on 
Reparations in Societies in Transition. In: The Handbook of Reparations. Ed. by Pablo de 
Greiff. New York 2006, p.560-588.  
The Handbook of Reparations. Edited by Pablo de Greiff. New York, (Oxford University 
Press) 2006. 
 
Heikkila, Mikaela. International Criminal Tribunals and Victims of Crime: A Study of the 
Status of Victims before International Criminal Tribunals and of Factors Affecting This 
Status. 1
st
 Edition. Turku, (Institute for Human Rights Aabo Akademi University) 2004. 
 
Malamud-Goti, Jaime E. and Lucas Sebastian Grosman. Reparations and Civil Litigation: 
Compensation for Human Rights Violations in Transitional Democracies. In: The 
Handbook of Reparations. Ed. by Pablo de Greiff. New York 2006, p.539-559.  
 
Nygaard, Lynn P., Writing for Scholars: A Practical Guide to Making Sense and Being 
Heard. Oslo, (Universitetsforlaget) 2008. 
 
Pete, Stephen and Max du Plessis. Reparations for Gross Violations of Human Rights in 
Context. In: Repairing the Past. Ed. By Max du Plessis and Stephen Pete. Antwerp 2007, 
p.3-28. 
 
 81 
Schabas, William A.,  The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In: 
Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century. Ed. by Naomi Roht-Arriza and Javier 
Mariezcurren. Cambridge, UK, (Cambridge University Press) 2006, p. 21-42. 
 
 
Shelton, Dinah. Remedies in International Human Rights Law. 2
nd
 Edition. Oxford, 
(Oxford University Press) 2005. 
 
Shelton, Dinah. The United Nations Principles and Guidelines on Reparations: Context 
and Contents. In: Out of the Ashes: Reparation for Victims of Gross and Systematic 
Human Rights Violations. Ed. by K. De Feyter, S. Parmentier, M. Bossuyt, and P. 
Lemmens. Antwerp 2005, p. 11-33. 
 
Surviving Field Research: Working in violent and difficult situations. Edited by Chandra 
Lekha Sriram and John C. King. New York, (Routledge) 2009. 
 
Teitel, Ruti G., Transitional Justice. New York, (Oxford University Press) 2000. 
 
Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century. Edited by Naomi Roht-Arriza and Javier 
Mariezcurren. Cambridge, UK, (Cambridge University Press) 2006. 
 
Van Boven, Theo. Preface. In: Out of the Ashes: Reparation for Victims of Gross and 
Systematic Human Rights Violations. Ed. by K. De Feyter, S. Parmentier, M. Bossuyt, and 
P. Lemmens. Antwerp 2005, p. v-vii. 
 
War, Conflict and Human Rights: Theory and Practice. Chandra Lekha Sriram…[et al.]. 
New York, (Routledge) 2010.  
 
 
 
 82 
PART IIII – Other  
 
Online Documents 
 
[BBC News?]. Sierra Leone leader lambasts „corrupt‟ ministers. London 27/01/2010 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8483840.stm [cited: 2/02/2010]  
 
 [BBC News?] Sierra Leone courts international investors. London 23/11/2009. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8375257.stm [cited: 02/02/2010]  
 
[BBC News?]. Norway „the best place to live‟. London 5/10/2009 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/8290550.stm [cited: 10/02/2010] 
 
CIA World Factbook. Sierra Leone. Washington D.C. 2010. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sl.html [cited: 
10/02/2010]  
 
Doctors Without Borders. Special Report: Assessing Trauma in Sierra Leone. NY 2000. 
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/article.cfm?id=1459 [cited: 6/04/2010] 
 
Handicap International. Sierra Leone Country Profile. London 2010. http://www.handicap-
international.org.uk/page_673.php [cited: 5/02/2010] 
 
International Organization for Migration (IOM). Reparations for Sierra Leone‟s War 
Victims Essential for Country‟s Future. Geneva 17/11/2009. 
http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/media/press-briefing-
notes/pbnEU/cache/offonce?entryId=26642 [cited: 23/03/2010] 
 
 83 
International Organization for Migration (IOM). What Hope of Reparations for Sierra 
Leone‟s War Victims? Geneva 18/11/2009. http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/media/press-
briefing-notes/pbnEU/cache/offonce?entryId=26642 [cited: 23/03/2010] 
 
International Organization for Migration (IOM). IOM Provides Technical Assistance to 
Reparations Programme for Victims of Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone. Geneva 
23/03/2010. http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/media/press-briefing-
notes/pbnAF/cache/offonce/lang/en?entryId=27138 [cited: 2/04/2010] 
 
Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN). Sierra Leone: War-wounded get micro-
grants. Freetown 12/11/2009. 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b013b78c.html [cited: 23/03/2010] 
 
Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN). Sierra Leone: Reviewing reparation 
progress. Dakar 9/12/2009. http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=87380 [cited: 
23/03/2010] 
 
Koroma, Allieu Vandi. Repairing War Victims in Sierra Leone: Some Underlying 
Challenges in the Reparations Programme. Freetown 2009. 
http://www.slcmp.org/drwebsite/commentaries/Repairing_War_Victims_in_Sierra_Leone.
shtml [cited: 05/02/2009]. 
 
Roughneen, Simon. For now, Peace in Sierra Leone. Freetown 2009. 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?lng=en&id=110478 
[cited: 02/02/2010]  
 
 Sierra Leone High Commission United Kingdom (SLHCUK). Sierra Leone Country 
Profile. London 2010. http://www.slhc-uk.org.uk/countryprofile.htm [cited: 5/02/2010]  
 
 84 
Sierra Leone Information System (SLIS). The Sierra Leone Encyclopedia 2008: National 
Commission for Social Action. Freetown 2008. http://www.daco-
sl.org/encyclopedia/1_gov/1_3nacsa.htm [cited: 8/04/2010] 
 
Transparency International. Corruption Perceptions Index 2009. Berlin 2009. 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table 
[cited: 6/04/2010] 
 
Voice of America (VoA). Sierra Leone war victims sign up for reparations. Makeni, Sierra 
Leone 19/02/2009. http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-02-19-voa30-
68811767.html [cited: 23/03/2010] 
 
World Health Organization (WHO). Country Health System Fact Sheet 2006-Sierra Leone. 
Freetown: World Health Organization Regional Office for Africa: Sierra Leone, 2006. 
http://www.afro.who.int/en/sierra-leone/who-country-office-sierra-leone.html [cited: 
20/04/2010]   
 
The World Bank (WB). Poverty data-A supplement to World Development Indicators 
2008. Washington 2008. 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:22
151356~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html [cited: 2/04/2010] 
 
Public Statements  
Amnesty International. Sierra Leone Government urged to implement the 
recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC): Public Statement. 
London: AI, 2005. (AFR 51/012/2005) 
http:www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR51/012/2005/en [cited: 22/09/09] 
 
 85 
Amnesty International. Sierra Leone‟s victims should not be forgotten simply because they 
have not been heard: Public Statement. London: AI, 26/03/2007. (AFR 51/001/2007) 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR51/001/2007/en [cited: 22/09/09] 
 
Amnesty International. Sierra Leone: Getting Reparations Right for Survivors of Sexual 
Violence (Including Amendments): Report. London: AI, 01/11/2007. (AFR 51/005/2007) 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR51/005/2007/en [cited: 01/11/2007] 
 
Interviews 
El Haji Jusu  Jarka. (AWWA) Interview. 5 July 2009.  
Bangura, Amadu. (Sierra Leones Reparation Program) Interview. 10 July 2009.  
Bokhari, Amar. (United Nations Development Program) Interview. 5 May 2010. 
De Cataldo, Tommaso. (International Organization for Migration) Email. 7 May 2010. 
Kamara, Buya. (Sierra Leone Reparation Program) Interview. 5 May 2010. 
Kargbo, Paul Kaplan. (International Organization for Migration) Email. 6 May 2010. 
Lamboi, Patrick. (United Nations Peacebuilding Fund Secretariat) Email. 5 May 2010. 
Schanke, Elise. (Norwegian Friends of Sierra Leone) Interview. 13 April 2010. 
 
Public Information Leaflet 
National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA) Reparations Outreach Unit. Sierra Leone 
Reparations Program: Providing redress and responding to the needs of victims of the 
Sierra Leone Conflict. Public Information Leaflet. Freetown: NaCSA, [2009?]. 
 
Map 
Sierra Leone Map: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/sierra_leone_pol_2005.jpg 
[cited:20/4/2010] 
     
       
 
 86 
 
 
 
 
 A 
Annex 
 
Additional Victim Testimonies 
 
Victim statement: 4 
This is a victim of a forced double hand amputation. Before the incident he had a 
reputable occupation and steady middle income. He has 3 dependents, and currently 
survives by begging for money from old and new acquaintances. 
 
In the middle of the day the RUF came to our house, knocking on our door, 
“Open”, and I could not open, I was amazed, discouraged, wondering if to 
open the door or not. They knock again, on the third knock now; I opened the 
door, immediately he said if I did not open the door he would fire at us. So I 
opened the door.  
 
Immediately he said, “Get of this house. Come out, come out.” We came out 
of the house, and he saw my daughter. She must have been eight by then. He 
said to my daughter, “I came with my wife and children and they were killed. 
So I will take you as my wife. So take my bag and follow me now.”  
She said “Wait for me, let me take my slippers.” And she went through the 
parlor. So, I tell her to escape through the window. She did, and I came back 
and met the rebels. I told him I could not find my daughter. The rebel 
responded by saying, “If I do not see your daughter I have no other reason 
but to shoot you.”  
 
I said, “Don‟t shoot me sir, I am going to find my daughter.” So I started 
pretending as if I was looking for my daughter between the chairs. 
Immediately, I turn around and to try and get rid of his weapon. Then we 
started fighting. We struggle for thirty minutes, while my wife is screaming, 
“I beg you, I beg you, I beg you please.”  
 
I am unable to remove his weapon, but I knock him on the front. I then run 
and jump through the window and try to find my way through the bush. Then 
his rebel colleagues got hold of me and held me as a prisoner, and took me to 
 B 
a fallen mango tree trunk where I saw so many of my neighbors gathered at 
gun point.  
 
We were told to line up. I was the third person in line. The first person had 
his hands amputated on the tree trunk and shot. The second person had his 
hands amputated on the tree trunk and shot. Then I was told to get down.  
 
While I was held down I was crying and crying telling them “you are my 
brothers”. He said “I am not your brother, If you were my brother you would 
of joined the West side boys (rebel group).” So they said “Spread your hands 
on the trunk of the mango tree.”  
 
They chopped one of my hands off, and then the other.  
 
I started screaming and crying. One of the rebels said “finish him”. And 
another rebel said, “That man could not be a survivor, let us not waste our 
cartilage on him.” 
 
I crawled and fell onto my veranda, laying there for five hours, until my wife 
and daughter came.  
My wife took some cloth and wrapped my hands to try and stop the bleeding, 
but there was too much blood. She took some more cloth, and tried to stop 
the bleeding, but nothing was helping.  
We start walking to find a hospital, but the rebels were everywhere.  
 
At that time I did not know if I was in this world or the next world. So we 
walk to Kissy (another part of town), and we had no food and no medical 
attention, because when the rebels came they took all the medicine from the 
doctors. So we stay there unattended for five days. Then we walk to the 
Ecomog (West African peace keeping force) base to try and get treatment. 
They performed surgery on my hands and I was in hospital for 3 months, and 
took us to the National Stadium (National Football Stadium) were Ecomog 
had set up an internally displaced persons camp for people from all over 
Sierra Leone trying to escape from the rebels. We stayed there for 2 months.  
 
I used to have a good job. Now I ask old friends for help. (SIC) 
 
Victim statement: 5 
She was subjected to gang rape and forcible amputation of her arm. Before the 
incident she was in school. Now she has a husband and 3 dependents.  
 
I was very young.  
 C 
It was the middle of the night when the rebels came.  
 
They threw fire into our house.  
To make us leave.  
There were people screaming.  
They grabbed me. And raped me over and over again.  
 
They wanted me to be a wife. A bush wife.  
 
I screamed. They chopped of my arm and left me to die. My family thought I 
was dead. I was thrown with other dead people. But someone found me. I 
survived. 
 
Now I am married, and have children. I want them to have an education. 
(SIC) 
 
 
 
 
